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What particular privilege has this little Agitation of the Brain which we call Thought,
that we must make it the Model of the whole Universe? (Hume, Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion, 1976, p. 168)
******
…at once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man (sic) of Achievement especially
in Literature and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean Negative
Capability, that is when someone is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries,
doubts without any irritable reaching after fact and reason. (Keats 1959, p. 261)
******
Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in ihrer Gattung ihrer Erkennt-
nisse: dass sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann; denn sie sind
ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht beantworten
kann; denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der menschlichen Vernunft. (Opening lines
of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1956), A VII; the italics in the text are mine)
Human reason has the particular fate1 in one branch of its investigations: that it is
harassed by questions which it cannot dismiss out of hand, for they are posed to it by
the nature of reason itself; but which it also cannot answer, for they exceed all capacity
of human reason.
******
1 It may be metaphysically relevant in this well-known context that “fatum”—before the Romans hijacked
the expression for the ‘decrees’ of their ‘gods’—was simply “what was spoken”, and in that sense “deemed”,
or “judged” (from “fari”, to speak, akin to phemi and phasko in Greek).
W. Boos (B)
University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
e-mail: florence-boos@uiowa.edu
123
4254 Synthese (2014) 191:4253–4314
Der Verstand macht für die Vernunft ebenso einen Gegenstand aus, als die Sinnlichkeit
für den Verstand. Die Einheit aller möglichen empirischen Verstandeshandlungen
systematisch zu machen, ist ein Geschäft der Vernunft, sowie der Verstand das Man-
nigfaltige der Erscheinungen durch Begriffe verknüpft und unter empirische Gesetze
bringt. Die Verstandeshandlungen aber, ohne Schemata der Sinnlichkeit, sind unbes-
timmt; ebenso ist die Vernunfteinheit auch in Ansehung der Bedingungen, unter denen,
und des Grades, wie weit, der Verstand seine Begriff systematisch verbinden soll, an
sich selbst unbestimmt. Allein, obgleich für die durchgängige systematische Einheit
aller Verstandesbegriffe kein Schema in der Anschauung ausfindig gemacht werden
kann, so kann und muß doch ein Analogon eines solchen Schema gegeben wer-
den, welches die Idee des Maximum der Abteilung und der Vereinigung der Ver-
standeserkenntnis in einem Prinzip ist. (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B692; the italics
are again mine)
Understanding constitutes an object for reason just as the sensory [does] for under-
standing. To render the unity of all possible operations of the understanding systematic
is an affair of reason, [just] as understanding structures and brings under empirical
laws the manifold of appearances. The operations of the understanding, however,
without schemata of what is sensory, are undetermined; just as the unity of reason
in itself is undetermined with respect to the conditions under which and degree to
which understanding is supposed to structure and interrelate its concepts. But though
no comprehensive schema of systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding can
be found in intuition, an analogon of such a schema, namely the idea of the maximum
of (sub)division and unification of conceptual knowledge in a principle, can and must
be found.
Abstract
In this essay, I
1 conjecture that Galileo’s “book of philosophy” (not “nature”) may not be written
in Galileo’s mathematics, but in Hilbert’s and Gödel’s metamathematics;
2 outline a common metalogical analysis of four ‘cogito’-like arguments: Descartes’
original, Berkeley’s (1979) ‘master-argument’, and Kant’s ‘metaphysical’ and ‘tran-
scendental’ ‘deductions’;
3 advocate a ‘skeptical’2 form of ‘transcendental idealism’, which ‘locally’ dis-
tinguishes ‘experiential’ assertions from metatheoretic ‘preconditions’ for their
‘intended’ interpretation;
4 and argue
(i) that “experience” is a rational but inherently ‘problematic’ regulative ideal
(cf. KdrV, 1956, B100);
(ii) that the integrity of ‘essentially incomplete’ but ‘intelligible’ inquiry is the only
‘unity’ such “experience” could have; and
2 The “skeptics” were “reflective” (“skeptikoi”) “seekers” (“zetetikoi”), who “sought” to “see (more)”
(“skeptesthai”). What they “sought” was not ‘the’ “truth”—ironically, derived in English from a Germanic
word for “trust” or “belief”—but ‘locally’ adequate “vantage-points” (“skopoi”, “skopia”) of “insight”
(“skemma”) and conceptual ‘tranquility’ (“ataraxia”).
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(iii) that ‘almost all’ ‘maximal limits’ to which such ‘experiential’ inquiry might
converge would be intrinsically ‘unintelligible’. (“Es ist das Mystische….”)
1 Introduction
‘Neo-Kantians’ such as Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer ‘relativised’ Kant’s
attempts to ‘ground’ “Erfahrung” (experience) in an “Architektonik” derived from
Newtonian spacetime, in an effort to refine his ‘critical’ presuppositions, and accom-
modate more recent mathematical and scientific inquiries into the ‘hermeneutics’ of
differential geometry and mathematical physics undertaken by Gauss, Lobachevsky,
Poincaré, Lorentz, Hilbert, Einstein and others.
In this essay and a pair of sequels I ‘relativise’ Kant’s attempts to explore ascending
levels of ‘reflective inquiry’ and ‘regulative principles’ in his three Critiques, in an
effort to refine his “dialectical”, “practical” and “teleological” extensions of the first’s
‘theoretical’ “Architektonik” of (Newtonian scientific) ‘experience’, and accommo-
date more recent metalogical and metamathematical inquiries into the ‘hermeneutics’
of concept-formation undertaken by Hilbert, Skolem, Gödel, Tarski, Keisler, Scott,
Solovay and others.
In potted-historical terms, a preliminary rationale for such a ‘relativisation’, and
for the ‘skeptical’ as well as ‘locally transcendental’ idealism’ I will derive from it,
might be sketched as follows.
There is a sense—to which people like Cassirer were particularly attentive—in
which Kant ‘merely’ emulated Leibniz’ and Leonhard Euler’s impassioned attempts
to respond to the metaphysical resonance of Galileo’s (often-misquoted) suggestion
in the Assayer (Opere 6:23:2): that the “vast book” of “philosophy” would be “written
in the language of mathematics”.
More than a century later, working scientists and historians of science among Cas-
sirer’s predecessors and contemporaries such as Hertz, Helmholtz, Duhem and others
also attempted to respond to Galileo’s dictum in new ways, and Peano, Frege and Rus-
sell more or less simultaneously formalised the ‘neo-Leibnizian’ recursive framework
of a quantificational logic, which gave rise rather quickly to intriguing “semantic-
paradoxical” refinements of Kant’s “mathematische und dynamische Antinomien”.
During the twentieth century, ‘logicists’ and ‘logical positivists’—most of them
convinced that such paradoxes would be swept aside by a new ‘empiricist’ synthesis—
drew on work of Duhem and others to propose ‘reductive’ translations of Galileo’s
“vast book” into rudimentary forms of first-order logic, Russellian type-theory and
Zermelian set theory, and sidestep skeptical implications of these antinomies implicit
in the work of Skolem and Gödel.
Against the grain of this (admittedly partial as well as summary) historical sketch,
I wish to suggest that
1 efforts on the part of the logical positivists’ more nuanced ‘analytical’ successors
to titrate conventional empiricism with a bit of ‘logic’ have not yielded a stable
response to these and other antinomies (and never will),
and propose a conjectural ‘metalogische Wende’, or (in more pretentious emulation of
Kant’s preface to the first Critique (cf. B XVI ff.)), “Revolution”: that
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2 future ‘books’ which record inquiries into boundaries of (inquiries into (boundaries
of (…. ‘philosophy’))) will be ‘written in the languages of metamathematics’;
and that
3 the ‘texts’ of such ‘books’will be ‘intelligible’ (recursively axiomatisable, essen-
tially incomplete) theories, representable as ‘closed’ subsets of a ‘universal’ topo-
logical and measure-space adumbrated in the ‘dyadic’ writings of Leibniz (1978),
and reintroduced in nineteenth- and twentieth-century guises by Cantor (1933) and
Marshall Stone.
In opposition to Kant and his empiricist successors’ efforts to ‘define’ or ‘demar-
cate’ a ‘canonical’ or ‘surveyable’ “Bereich der Erfahrung” (“range of experience”)—
via ‘critical methods’, ‘transcendental’ analyses or more alembicated ad hoc method-
ological ‘titrations’ of ‘empiricism’ of the sort just mentioned—I will also
4 outline ‘locally transcendental’ rationales for the epistemic and metaphysical ade-
quacy of essentially incomplete (first-order) theories;
5 interpret Kant’s “kritische Methode” and ‘constitutive’/‘regulative’ distinction as
partial anticipations of metalogicians’ ‘theory’/‘metatheory’ distinctions;
6 invoke well-studied arguments to argue that such ‘local’ distinctions and method-
ological principles generate ‘heuristic’ iterative hierarchies of concept-formation;
and
7 characterise (but not ‘define’) “experience” as a ‘heuristic’, distributive, ‘prob-
lematic’ (cf. KdrV, B100) and ‘merely regulative’ temporal process of ramified
‘ascents’ within such hierarchies.
A few preliminary remarks may anticipate immediate and obvious objections to
these proposals, and my eclectic and ‘impressionist’ use in them of metalogical terms-
of-art such as ‘object-’ and ‘metatheory’. Philosophers often find such ‘technical’
terms-of-art reductive; and logicians, for their part, find philosophical uses of them
jejune. Perhaps eclectic uses of them fall into the sort of conceptual intermundium C.
P. Snow wrote about many years ago.
Be that as it may, both the views just cited seem to me prejudices, as the proposals
in 2 and 3 make clear. If these proposals have heuristic value, the methodological
partitions and preconceptions just cited will erode as needs to
8 provide coherent accounts of ‘artificial’ as well as ‘natural’ sentience, and
9 develop natural-scientific analyses of notions such as ‘existence’, ‘complexity’,
‘randomness’ and ‘experimental ‘isolation’.
become more apparent.
Kant, in any case, was no more acquainted with ‘first-order metatheoretical hierar-
chies’ than he was with ‘time-orientable locally Lorentzian manifolds’. He did, how-
ever, make a number of suggestive attempts to distinguish “regulative” from “consti-
tutive” applications (“Gebräuche”) of broadly problematic ‘higher-order’ ‘principles’
and metaphysical assertions (cf. the passage KdrV, B692, quoted at length above).
Such distinctions—or superpositions of distinctions—first appeared in B536–B611
of the Transcendental Dialectic. Kant then took them more or less for granted there-
after, and applied them passim to more abstruse and underdetermined ranges of prac-
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tical (ethical) as well as teleological assertions and principles in Dialectic as well as
the second and third Critiques.
At a kind of asymptotic limit of such ‘principles’, he even appealed at various points
in all three Critiques and their ancillary texts to the notion of a regulative Ideal—an
interpretative Grenzidee which seems to me as ‘reflexive’, suggestive and conceptually
underdetermined as Aristotle’s theoria, and shadowy “aggregates” (“Vielheiten”) of
the sort Georg Cantor aptly called “inkonsistent” (‘the’ paradoxical “aggregate” of
‘all’ consistent recursively axiomatisable first-order theories, for example; cf. Cantor
1933, pp. 443–444, reprinted in Van Heijenoort 1967, p. 114).
In Sect. 2 below, I will consider certain attempts to coopt and normalise ancient
skeptical notions of ‘ta phainomena’ in ways which might
10 ensure that a fixed ‘maximal’ realm or “aggregate” of such phainomena ‘must’
exist, and
11 furnish ‘design’-arguments for the ‘existence’ and ‘unicity’ of ‘experience’
(rather than ‘god’).
In Sections 3 and 4, I will
12 examine ‘pre-theoretical’ or ‘pre-metalogical’ characterisations of “‘cogito’-like”
arguments;
13 argue that such arguments can be construed as informal prototypes of “fixed-point
arguments”; and
14 ‘test’ these anachronistic characterisations against four historical ‘examples’:
(i) Descartes’ “cogito”-argument, and its stoic and Augustinian antecedents;
(ii) Berkeley’s more original but strangely ill-regarded “master-argument”;
and in somewhat greater detail in the next section,
(iii) Kant’s “transcendental” and “metaphysical deductions” of the “necessity of
the possibility” of “synthetic a priori3 judgment(s)”, and
(iv) ‘the’ allegedly unique structures of “experience” which such judgments “deter-
mine” when they are “constitutive”, and ‘underdetermine’ when they are
“(‘merely’) (regulative)”.
In Sections 5–8, I will
15 focus on metalogically syntactical and semantic as well as informal interpretations
for the ‘unicity’ of ‘rule’-bound theoretical ‘experience’ Kant hoped to derive from
his “transzendentale Deduktion”,
3 I will attach little or no epistemic or metaphysical significance in the sequel to
‘adverbial’ and ‘adjectival’ readings of the ablative phrase “a priori”.
I do this in part because
(i) there is little or no syntactical distinction between such usages in German; and in part because
(ii) there is little or no semantic distinction, at least in Latin, English, French or German, between
(iii) ‘adjectival’ phrases which qualify ‘processive’ nouns (“judgment” (or “judgement”) a priori; “ex
cathedra decree”; “off the cuff estimate”; “prima facie plausibility”); and
(iv) ‘adverbial’ phrases which qualify ‘processive’ verbs and adjectives (“judge” (or “juger”) “a priori”;
“decree ex cathedra”; “estimate off the cuff”’; “prima facie plausible”).
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16 argue for metamathematical interpretations of such “rules”, and offer ‘skeptically
transcendental’ rationales for the recurrent and interpretive uses of first-order the-
ories in the metatheoretical hierarchies mentioned in 6 and 7 above, and
17 adduce a modest result of metalogical ‘folklore’: that no ‘faithful’ syntactical
interpretation of an ‘experiential’ ‘object-theory’ can be defined in any metatheory
of “concepts of the understanding” (“Verstandesbegriffe”) which proves that such
an object-theory is consistent.
On the one hand, the metamathematical observation in 15 suggests that
18 no metalogically tenable ‘transcendental deduction’ of the ‘existence’ of a ‘faith-
ful’ interpretation of a provably consistent ‘experiential’ object-theory can be for-
mulated.
19 On the other, it also suggests (to me at least) that
(i) indeterminate as well as underdetermined recourses to ‘higher’-order metathe-
ories, which semantically interpret (‘lower’ levels or stages of) ‘experience’
introduce ever-higher-order mathematical as well as metamathematical ana-
logues of
(ii) Kant’s ‘merely regulative’ “intelligibele Ursachen” (‘intelligible causes’) and
“Vernunftbegriffe” (‘concepts of reason’)
into the object-theoretical processes they interpret, and that
(iii) the resulting ‘eternal return’—or more precisely, ‘eternal recurrence’ of
alternating ‘object’- and ‘metatheoretic’ (‘epistemic’and ‘metaphysical’)
‘boundary-conditions’—is indeed the “fate of reason”. But may also be—in
several senses—its “grace”….
2 [Reflective inquiry into ‘ultimate’ limits of
[Reflective inquiry into ‘ultimate’ limits of
[Reflective inquiry into ‘ultimate’ limits of
[….]]]]
Pyrrhonist skeptics often claimed to follow ‘undogmatically’ what they called ta
phainomena—a Greek neuter plural participle which is usually ‘objectified’ in (oddly
quasi-Kantian) English as ‘the appearances’. (It might be more accurately rendered
as ‘whatever things “seem (to be)”’.)
Whatever the translation, relational and intentional implications of such usages—
‘seem’ or ‘appear’, under what circumstances, and to what?—have always fostered
‘idealist’ interpretations of ‘ta phainomena’ as (‘mere’) ‘intentional objects’.
These interpretations, in turn, crossed metaphysical boundaries in interesting ways:
‘dogmatic’ proto-‘cogito’-arguments might be found in them, as well as rationales for
(otherwise rather puzzling) eighteenth-century claims that George Berkeley was a
‘skeptic’.
This ambiguity itself has also been historically generative, in ways genuine
‘suspenders-of-judgment’ and ‘skeptics’ (‘observers’, ‘searchers’) might applaud.
Much of the history of early modern philosophy as well as the science which crys-
talised out of it might be read as a series of brilliantly informative attempts to coopt
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skeptics’ ‘phenomenalism’ for ‘dogmatic’ purposes, with the aid of arguments which
‘normalised’ or ‘uniformised’ their ‘phainomena’.
Galileo, for example, sought such uniformities in the syntax and semantics of math-
ematics, in the passage from the Assayer cited earlier. And Descartes, Leibniz, Newton
and Berkeley sought them in the hermeneutic (and mathematical) capacities of that
great ‘analyst’, ‘god’.
Hume—even less plausibly, in my view—sought them in the persistence of
human “Custom or Habit”. Kant, finally, sought to ‘deduce’ them, in a great secular
Newtonian-scientific synthesis whose ‘transcendental’ adaequatio would be ‘com-
plete’ enough to determine (or dispense with) its limiting res (or ‘Dinge an sich’).
Intricately interrelated refinements in the languages of Galileo’s mathematical
‘book’, in short, have provided, and will continue to provide, heuristic ways to explore
endless ramifications of ‘mere’ phenomena.
But these ‘ramifications’ also bring into focus two deeper (and closely interrelated)
skeptical reservations, which philosophical efforts to coopt skeptical phainomena have
left unanswered (and, in my opinion at least, almost untouched).
The first is
1 that postulation of ‘unique’ metaphysical limits of these practices (whatever they
may be called) amount to secular—mathematical and ‘physical’—refinements of
‘arguments from design’—not for the ‘existence’ of ‘god’, but for the existence of
‘the’ phainomena (a slightly ironic echo, perhaps, of “deus sive natura”).
(Notice once again in this context the extent to which
2 the ‘structural’ and ‘constitutive’ uniformity and intertranslatability Kant attributed
to his ‘phenomena’ (‘Erscheinungen’)
may be assimilated to
3 the ‘structural’ and ‘constitutive’ uniformity and intertranslatability Berkeley
attributed to his all-seeing ‘God’ or “The Author of Nature”.)
A second and (again in my opinion) deeper reservation derives from one of the
ancient skeptics’ more acute insights and anti-stoic ‘tropoi’ (‘turns’):
4 that the very notion of ‘completeness’ may therefore be conceptually ‘liminal’ and
‘theory-relative’, and in that sense incomplete; and in particular,
5 that conceptual as well as phenomenal ‘relationality’ and ‘intentionality’ may be
iterable ‘eis apeiron’—‘into (what is) infinite’, and ‘into (what is) untried, or
unexperienced’ (both readings are etymologically defensible).
There are essentially two ways to respond to this extended skeptical ‘regress’ (or
‘ascent’), and block ‘iteration’, ‘ramification’ and ‘indefinition’ of the hierarchies to
which it gives rise:
6 to ‘bound’ such iterations in a unique ‘limit’; and
7 to ‘diagonalise’ over them, in allegedly ‘canonical’ ways which appeal to informal
counterparts of metalogical ‘fixed-point’-arguments.
I will devote the most of the rest of this section to the first, and the next to the second.
‘Semantic monist’ commitments of any sort to the effect that
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8 there ‘must’ ‘exist’ one and exactly one ‘universal’ interpretation of a sufficiently
‘comprehensive’ (as well as consistent) theory T of ‘experiential’ phenomena
(which must, then, be the ‘intended’ interpretation of T, if there is one)
have traditionally had (at least) three venerable but fallacious arguments or argument-
forms at their disposal, in my view:
9 ‘existence-of-maximality’-arguments, often analysable as instances of object-
theoretic quantifier-error;
10 ‘existence-of-determination’-arguments, which I will interpret as subtler and more
plausible variants of metatheoretic quantifier-error; and finally
11 ‘uniqueness-of-maximality-and-determination’-arguments, which may be
analysed as misreadings of informal patterns of metatheoretic Stone-‘duality.’
In ‘existence of maximality’-arguments, for example, one ‘derives’ the ‘existence’
of a unique ‘maximal’ bearer of a property (‘maximal’ in the sense of some ‘practical’
or ‘metaphysical’ ordering) from assumptions (often begged) about the structure of
an ordering or hierarchy.
One might, for example, ‘infer’
12 ‘(necessary) existence’ of a ‘maximal’ relational entity (‘cause’; ‘explanation’;
‘perfection’; ….), from
13 corresponding ‘medial’ premises (every ‘effect’ has a ‘cause’; every ‘phenom-
enon’ has an ‘explanation’; every ‘quality’ ‘has’ less ‘perfection’ than some
other; …).
I characterised certain instances of ‘existence of maximality’-arguments in 9 and 10
above as ‘quantifier-errors’. Kant had no symbolic treatments of such formal ‘error’ at
his disposal, in part because precise formal studies of indefinite quantifier-alternation
came very late to ‘syllogistic’ logic.
But his analyses of ‘transcendent’ “Regressus der Bedingungen” in the Antinomies
of the first Critique made it clear that he saw through several ‘classical’ ‘mathemat-
ical’ and ‘dynamical’ ‘existence-of-maximality’-arguments (at least in ‘constitutive’
contexts: cf., e.g., KdrV, B692).
Subtler and more ‘metatheoretic’ ‘existence-of-determination’-arguments have
been adduced since antiquity to justify, in some elusively absolute theory-marginal
sense, the ‘existence’ of a definitive ‘criterion of truth’, ultimate ‘intended interpre-
tation’ or other extratheoretic form of semantic closure.
Roughly speaking, such ‘existence-of-determination’-arguments derive proto-
metatheoretic claims about ‘final causality’ (for example) from tacit or explicit coun-
terparts of the quantifier-errors ‘existence-of-maximality’-arguments applied to their
‘formal’ or ‘efficient’ counterparts.
I will call this argument-type in both cases (for lack of any other name) the metathe-
oretic EA-argument, from a standard logical usage for sentences with existential-
universal (’exists-for all’) quantifier-structure: sentences, in other words, of the form
‘there exists an x such that for all y (s(x,y)). (AE- or universal-existential sentences,
by contrast, have the form ‘for all x there exists a y such that (s(x,y))).
Here, for example, are two thumbnail templates of such arguments, formulated in
terms of “reasons” rather than “causes” (“aitia” meant both in Aristotle’s Greek):
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14 if for everything a contextual reason may be found, a noncontextual reason ‘must’
(allegedly) be found for Everything;
15 if for everything a ‘better’ reason may be found, a ‘best’ reason ‘must’ (allegedly)
be found for Everything.
More often than not, such EA-arguments were (and still are) formulated in ‘elenctic’,
contrapositive forms. Such an argument played a prominent role, for example, in one
of Socrates’ ‘refutations’ of the ‘vitiated’ semantic relativity Plato (1969) attributed
to Protagoras in the Theaetetus, where Socrates fallaciously claimed (in effect) that
anyone who rejects the EA-claim,
16 that there ‘must’ exist a single ‘best’ objective or intersubjective standard for all
human judgments,
‘must’ also reject a cognate, but quantifier-reversed and weaker, AE-claim,
17 that for all human judgments, ‘better’ contextual standards exist for evaluation of
those judgments’ truth.
More subtly fallacious counterparts of such EA-arguments—to the effect that “not
(there exists an x such that for all y s(x,y))” would ‘imply’ “not (for all x there exists
a y such that s(x,y))”—seem to me to enable ‘cogito-like’-arguments which are also
implicit in Kant’s ‘transcendental deduction’, a view I will elaborate in the next section.
In a wide range of classical and contemporary metaphysical contexts (justifications
of mathematical ‘realism’, for example), the specious attractiveness of semantic EA-
arguments is roughly equivalent to the specious attractiveness of ‘semantic monist’
views they support.
When such ‘existence’-assertions are formulated in formally or informally
‘stronger’ theoretical contexts U, however, (as they are in the next section’s ‘cogito’-
like arguments), parity of reasoning raises analogous ‘criterial’ questions about the
semantic credentials of U. And iterations of such questions and responses generate
‘natural’ informal counterparts of the introduction’s ‘metatheoretic ascents’.
Such ‘regressive’ hierarchies have typically been blocked by (fallacious as well as
semantically equivocal) ‘modal’ EA-assertions that
18 there ‘must’ ‘exist’ a ‘unique’ last metatheory U for T which uniquely interprets
[itself], and therefore ‘proves’ or ‘grounds’ [its own existence]
which ‘modally’ beg the semantic-monist desiderata in question (with or without
the Gödelian ‘coding brackets’ “[…]”,which ‘reduce’ semantic ‘use’ to syntactical
‘mention’).
As the parenthetical remarks in 16–18 suggest, their existence-claims have also
been informally begged on the basis of the very ‘comprehensiveness’ of the theories
in question (an attractive but thoroughly dubious enthymeme, as Cantor saw when he
called class-theoretic counterparts of such ‘comprehension’ “inkonsistent”).
It is correct, for example, that a theory in a given fixed language has fewer interpreta-
tions the more ‘complete’ it is (the more assertions it decides). This is the fundamental
underlying datum of a metalogical pattern called ‘Stone duality’ (cf., e.g., Bell and
Machover 1977, pp. 141–149).
19 But the same ‘dual’ analysis also establishes that
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(i) theories in fixed languages have more interpretations the fewer assertions they
‘decide’ (the more ‘abstract’ they are);
and as a corollary of Craig’s Theorem (cf., e.g., Chang and Keisler 1973/1972,
pp. 84–87), that
(ii) theories in ‘augmented’ languages have more interpretations when the terms
in which their additional axioms are formulated are ‘new’.
Sometimes, however, cognate ‘monist’ arguments have been begged on the basis
of a subtler, tacitly metatheoretic argument which anticipated ‘cogito’-like arguments
(including Kant’s ‘transzendentale Deduktionen’) considered in greater detail in the
next section:
20 that the position I called semantic monism above ‘must’ be accepted;
for if it is not, then
21 incoherence would be the consequence, and we would not even be able then to
query the claim.
(Cf. the miniature reconstruction of the Theaetetus-argument in 16 and 17 above,
and related claims that semantic-hierarchical relativism is ‘self-refuting’, and
therefore incoherent).
22 Dialectically attractive though such arguments may seem, they were really lit-
tle more than ‘transcendental’ second-order petitiones and quasi-metatheoretic
reassertions of the supposition (closely related to 18 above):
(i) that any ‘sufficiently’ ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ as well as consistent theory
must have a unique interpretation;
or its contraposition,
(ii) that any ‘sufficiently’ ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ theory without a unique
interpretation would be inconsistent.
For not only is the ‘inference’ just sketched refutable, for a wide range of philo-
sophically relevant theories T (cf. 28–31 below), in any theoretical venue in which it
can be expressed. It is essentially an amorphously ‘modal’ type-raised counterpart of
what is being ‘deduced’.
Subtler but analogously dubious ‘existence of determination’-arguments also
appeared at several points in Kant’s ‘speculative’, ‘practical’ and ‘teleological’
‘Deduktionen’, usually in contrapositive forms.
Compare, for example,
23 ‘Experience’ ‘must’ have a unique ‘transcendental’ structure. For many instances
of it would otherwise be ‘merely empirical’.
24 ‘Practical’ judgment ‘must’ have a unique ‘transcendental’ structure (at least
‘regulatively’). For otherwise, ‘our’ actions would be governed by ‘mere interest’.
Notice that
25 the first is a ‘critical’ paraphrase of the simple but dubious argument that ‘expe-
rience’ ‘must’ be unique, and therefore ‘determinate’ (for otherwise particular
instances of it would be ‘mere chance’);
26 the second is the ‘merely’ regulative (but comparably anacoluthic) argument that
‘’the’ moral order’ ‘must’ be unique, and therefore ‘determinate’ (for otherwise
particular instances of it would be ‘mere casuistry’).
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(In each of the formulations of 23–26, it may also be worth pointing out that “bestim-
men” in ordinary German means “define” as well as “determine”).
Notice also that these arguments have (or at least strongly suggest) a tacit quantifier-
structure—in the cases of 23 and 25, for example, the ‘inference’ is that
27 if every particular experience has a metatheoretic ‘determination’, a master-
metatheoretic ‘determination’ of ‘all’ ‘experience’ must ‘exist’;
and in 24, that
28 if every particular action has a metatheoretically defined moral ‘valuation’, a
master- metatheoretic moral ‘valuation’ of ‘all’ actions must ‘exist’.
(The bold face usages in 27 and 28 and the sequel are intended to reflect ‘hypostatic’
shifts in each case—from particular object-theoretic ‘experiences’, for example, to an
‘ultimate’ self-referential Grenzidee called ‘experience’.)
Observe, finally, that the quantifier-structures I have imputed to these ‘transcen-
dental’ arguments closely resemble that of traditional theological ‘arguments from
design’ (or more accurately, design):
29 if every particular phenomenon has a metatheoretically defined ‘design’, a (numi-
nous) master-metatheoretic ‘design’ of ‘all’ phenomena must ‘exist’.
In none of these limit-arguments (or ‘limit’-arguments) could one seriously argue
that the inference in question is (or ‘must’ be) metalogically valid.
Whether any of them is a tenable ‘deduction’ in some broader forensic sense of the
word is open to question. But any hypostatic ‘limit’ of such senses would be deeply
‘problematic’, in Kant’s usage.
Consider, for example, the analogies in 23–28. If they are (‘forensically’)
‘deducible’ in some ‘limiting’ hypostatic sense, why not their ‘physico-theological’
counterparts in 29 as well?
Finally, one might perhaps hope to recover the validity of such ‘deductions’ with
the aid of ‘uniqueness-of-maximality-and-determination’-arguments (cf. 11 above).
If, for example, semantic interpretations of theoretical designs (of whatever sort)
formed (what is called) a ‘direct system’, mathematical arguments would indeed yield
a unique ‘direct limit’ of such a system.
A good historical case can be made that Platonic, Stoic, Neoplatonic and other
‘dogmatic’ metaphysicians believed that theoretical ‘cognition’ ‘must’ be directed
with respect to mutual consistency.
But if such ‘cognition’ is ‘intelligible’, in a sense outlined below, it is not. To see
this, call a ‘philosophically relevant’ (first-order) theory T ‘intelligible’ if and only if
it is
30 ‘parsable’ (its language is countable, and the metatheoretically defined set of
Gödel-codes of its axioms is recursive; roughly speaking, it has an arithmetically
decidable ‘axiomatisation’); and
31 ‘autological’: (it syntactically interprets a theory of finite sets or theory of arith-
metic ‘strong’ enough to include a mathematical-induction scheme which permits
‘encoding’ of its proofs; roughly speaking, it has an arithmetically enumerable
‘proof-structure’).
The ‘philosophical relevance’ of
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32 ‘parsability’ is that no inscrutable metatheoretic ‘oracle’ (a word actually used in
recursion theory) would be needed to recognise the theory’s premises;
and of
33 ‘autologicality’ that the theory can trace out, step by step, its consequence-
relations, and pose (but not, Gödel discovered, answer) ‘internally’ coded counter-
parts of semantic questions about ‘itself’ (“Am ‘I’ ‘consistent”’? “ Do ‘I’ ‘exist”’?)
(cf., once again the first paragraph of the KdrV, cited above).
Together, these two conditions—which are most readily and neutrally formulated
in first-order set- or class-metatheories which permit semantic interpretations of T—
imply that Gödel’s incompleteness-theorems apply to T.
For from Gödel’s insights, it follows then that if one
34 partially orders a ‘system’ ST of (metatheoretically) consistent ‘intelligible’ exten-
sions of a given ‘intelligible’ theory T by setting T ′ ≺ T ′′ if and only if T ′ is a
subtheory of T ′′,
Then
35 ‘inverse’ (but not ‘direct)’limits or maximal ‘threads’ of the system ST exist (they
are the ‘models’ or semantic interpretations of T ) but
36 such ‘limits’—or ‘worlds’ in which T ‘holds’—are never unique. For any such
T , in fact, there will be as many such semantic interpretations of T as there are
real numbers in the (tacit metatheory’s) set-theoretic continuum.
Admittedly, the conditions in 32 and 33 are
37 intrinsically metatheoretic with respect to T.
But they also
38 apply equally well to the set- or class-metatheories just mentioned, as well as a
wide variety of other theories which are not first-order.
Efforts to make sense of first- and non-first-order theories T would give rise quite
naturally, therefore, to
39 ‘interleaved’ or ‘interpolated’first-order semantic hierarchies, in which every con-
sistent theory—first-order or not—would ‘eventually’ find an interpretation.
Such hierarchies offer a first rationale for enlargement of Galileo’s ‘book’ to the
metatheoretic compendia of interleaved commentaries proposed above, in which paths
of inquiry would not be directed, but ramify ad indefinitum.
Would inquiry in such hierarchies be dialectically clever, but ‘practically’, ‘specu-
latively’ and ‘teleologically’ jejune, as Socrates suggested Protagoras’ sophistry would
have to be?
In the following sections, I will continue to argue that it would not.
3 Reflective inquiry and ‘transcendent’ “[self]-validation”
As I mentioned in Sect. 2, one way to respond to dispel skeptical hierarchies is to
‘bound’ them in (allegedly) unique and determinate ‘limits’, and another to ‘diago-
nalise’ over them in (allegedly) stable and determinate ‘fixed-points’.
To clarify the latter, I will begin with a sense in which Kant (I believe) proposed
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1 a ‘cogito’-like fixed-point argument (or ‘necessity-of-the possibility of”-argument)
to ‘refute’ skepticism about the ‘necessity’ of a ‘uniquely’ ‘presupposed’ structure
of a generic ‘self,’ whose ‘intentions’ he identified with ‘Erkenntnis überhaupt’
(the ‘metaphysical deduction’, usually associated with Kant’s claims for the ‘com-
pleteness’ of his ‘logical’ categories); and
2 a second (‘cogito’-like) fixed-point argument (or ‘necessity-of-the possibility of”-
argument) to ‘prove’ that a uniquely ‘schematised’ cognitive structure ‘must’
‘determine’ isomorphic patterns in the ‘appearances’ it ‘must’ ‘experience’ (cf.
the ‘transcendental deduction’, usually associated with wider templates of ‘intu-
ition’ and ‘the understanding’ which also ‘determine’ ‘the’ structures of space and
time).
Put somewhat differently, Kant
3 ‘deduced’ from the first fixed-point argument above the ‘necessity of the possi-
bility’ of a uniform structure for ‘the’ mind’s (and ‘the minds”) ‘cognition’ (the
‘existence’ of which Berkeley had attributed to ‘God’, and the agnostic Hume later
acknowledged in the appendix to the Treatise he had essentially begged); and
4 ‘deduced’ from the second fixed-point argument the ‘necessity of the possibility’ of
Hume’s petitio, as a ‘unique’ ‘precondition’ or ‘presupposition’ for the ‘apodeictic’
‘necessity’ of four-dimensional Newtonian spacetime (which Kant—I will later
argue—tacitly acknowledged in the third Critique he had essentially begged).
In effect, I am arguing that Kant believed he had devised more innovative ‘dialec-
tical’ Augustinian/Cartesian fixed-point-arguments, which would modulate
5 assertions a ‘Newton of the Moral Sciences’ had made about highly normalised
forms of “Custom or Habit” into
6 more rigorous assertions an ‘architect’ of a ‘Copernican/Newtonian Turn’ hoped
to make about an even more highly normalised “Architektonik” ‘der’ Erfahrung.
After I develop this interpretation (which can be considered and accepted or rejected
in informal, non-‘metalogical’ terms), I will
7 consider straightforward but non-Kantian metamathematical glosses of “deduc-
tion” proposed in 1, and
8 prove a straighforward metalogical proposition which bears on the tenability of
metalogical analogues of the ‘results’ Kant thought he had achieved, as well as
the ‘transcendental methods’ he devised to ‘deduce’ them.
I will begin with an attempt to explain what I meant above by a “‘cogito’-like”
argument”, and outline the four historical examples mentioned in the essay’s intro-
duction.
I will call an (formal or informal) argument “‘cogito’-like” if it ‘satisfies’ the fol-
lowing conditions (cf. 10 through 15 below).
The argument employs
9 notions (tacitly or explicitly) posited in a ‘theoretical’ framework T and ‘wider’
‘theoretical’ framework U; and
10 assertions about ‘existence’ and ‘interpretation’ of T and notions in T, which may
be formulated in T as well as the ‘wider’ framework U.
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Moreover, the argument’s
11 ‘derivations’ and ‘demonstrations’ of assertions in T (from ‘obvious’ or ‘univer-
sally granted’ ‘first principles’ of T) also hold in U;
and its
12 ‘epistemic’ and ‘ontological’ assertions about what is ‘conceivable’ in T or ‘exists’
in T (e.g.) can be formulated in T as well as U, and sometimes ‘proved’ or ‘refuted’
(from equally ‘obvious’ ‘first principles’) in U;
Finally, the argument (ostensibly)
13 ‘derives’ the ‘epistemic’ and/or ‘ontological’ assertion  about T from ‘first prin-
ciples’ of U (or ‘confutes’ the ‘skeptical’ negation  of  in U);
and
14 ‘concludes’ from this that the ‘epistemic’ and/or ‘ontological’ assertion  is also
‘derivable’ from ‘first principles’ of T (so ‘must’ also be ‘refutable’ in T).
Admittedly, this ‘definition’ is long and convoluted, but so, I would argue, were its
historical prototypes. Part of my larger argument in the sequel will be that conceptual
(or ‘critical’) ‘theory/metatheory’-distinctions offer the only tenable remedies for such
convolutions and ambiguities.
The best informal rationale or plausibility-argument for the characterisation may
be the reconstructions it provides for study of the three or four well-known ‘argu-
ments’ from the history of early modern philosophy, mentioned earlier: Descartes’
(1973-1978) “cogito”-argument, Berkeley’s ‘master argument’ and the two best-
known Kantian ‘transcendental arguments’ (or ‘deductions’) in the Analytic of the
first Critique.
Before offering these reconstructions, I would like to apologise in advance for my
particularly extravagant use in them of single (‘scare’)-quotation-marks.
They are not, I believe, an affectation. For my underlying point in 15 through
26 below will be that such ‘scare-quoted’ nouns, pronouns, adjectives and adverbs
may be subjected to conceptually relevant forms of metalogical relativisation and
metatheoretic ascent.
In the case of Descartes’ (not entirely) original “cogito”,
15 T is ‘my’ theory of ‘myself’;
16 U is ‘god”s counterpart of ‘this’ theory; and
17  is an assertion of the ‘ontological’ ‘existence’ and unique interpretability of
‘my’ theory of ‘myself’ (which ‘I’ had epistemically ‘doubted’).
In the case of Berkeley’s (more original) ‘master argument’,
18 T is ‘the’ (theoretical) ‘idea’ of a given ‘external object’;
19 U is ‘the’ theoretical framework in which ‘god’ or another ‘spirit’ confers ‘exis-
tence’ on the ‘object’ of T by ‘perceiving’ (or ‘conceiving’, or ‘interpreting’) it;
and
20  asserts the ‘existence’ or ‘interpretability’ of the ‘object’ of this well-defined
‘idea’ T (the complex ‘object’ determined by a “mite”’s idea of its “foot”, for
example, in one of his more whimsical examples).
In the case of Kant’s (implicitly ‘Cartesian’) ‘metaphysical deduction’,
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21 T is ‘the’ theoretical framework of ‘forms of intuition’ and ‘categories of the
understanding’ which ‘constitute’ ‘Erkenntnis’ (“knowledge”);
22 U is ‘the’ (‘bloß regulative’) “systematische Einheit aller möglichen empirischen
Verstandeshandlungen” ((‘merely’ regulative) “systematic unity of all possible
actions of the understanding”) which Kant characterised as an “affair of reason”
“Geschäft der Vernunft” at KdrV, B692, cited above); and
23  asserts ‘the’ ‘unity’, ‘completeness’ and consequent ‘existence’ of 21’s ‘forms of
intuition’ and ‘categories of the understanding’ T which ‘determine’ or ‘constitute’
corresponding ‘interpretations’ of ‘experience’.
In the case of Kant’s (implicitly ‘Newtonian’) ‘transcendental deduction’,
24 T is ‘the’ theoretical framework or conceptual structure of ‘the’ ‘necessary’
Newtonian-scientific ‘preconditions’ which ‘constitute’ ‘Erkenntnis’;
25 U (once again) is ‘the’ (‘bloß regulative’) “systematische Einheit aller möglichen
empirischen Verstandeshandlungen”; and
26  asserts ‘the’ ‘existence’, ‘completeness’ and ‘transzendentale Einheit” of 24’s
Newtonian-scientific ‘preconditions’ for the framework T, which ‘determine’ or
‘constitute’ unique ‘interpretations’ of this framework in ‘experience’.
In each of the cases just canvassed, I will argue, the assertion ’s initial plausibility
derives from a dual premise:
27 that such an implicitly ‘metatheoretic’ U ‘exists’; and
28 that U’s ‘attributes’ ensure that all the relevant assertions of ‘existence’, ‘unicity’
and ‘interpretability’ of T encoded in  are ‘provable’ or ‘derivable’ or ‘demon-
strable’in U:
In Descartes’ case, these premises followed (via the ‘diagonal’ pons asinorum of the
‘circle’) from the veracity and ‘perfection’ of (Augustine’s, Anselm’s and Aquinas’)
‘god’ (1986; 1978).
In Berkeley’s, their counterparts followed from the kindness and hermeneutic agility
of a somewhat more ‘personal’ Anglican ‘god’, whose ‘existence’ he inferred from a
‘design’-argument.
In Kant’s case,
29 the (‘merely’ regulative) ‘existence’ of the theoretical framework U (a secular
Vernunftidee) is effectively secured by a ‘critical’ ‘design’-argument, and
30 the ‘existence’, (‘transcendental’) ‘interpretability’and (‘constitutive’) ‘unity’ of
‘experience’  attributes to T is secured in U by the ‘unicity’, ‘completeness’ and
‘universality’ Kant hoped he had ‘deduced’ from
31 the ‘unicity’, ‘completeness’ and ‘universality’ of T’s ‘forms’ and ‘categories’ (in
the ‘metaphysical’ deduction), and
32 the ‘unicity’, ‘completeness’ and ‘universality’ of the theoretical framework T of
Newtonian science (in the ‘transcendental’ deduction).
Whatever the merits of such “cogito’-like arguments”’ assertions that the ‘existence’-
and ‘unicity’-claims  are ‘demonstrable’ in U, I will also argue that
33 the ‘probative’ force and philosophical purchase of these arguments derive from
tacit ‘metatheoretic’ assumptions in each case that [’s demonstrability in U]
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implies [its demonstrability in T] (for metalogical counterparts of these assertions,
cf. 4.6 and 4.32 below).
Shamans and high priests have told us since time immemorial, after all (but without
philosophical ‘proof’), that ‘gods’ and other higher ‘unities’ U assure us ‘we’ exist,
and that our ‘experiential’ theories T ‘make sense’ in such U.
The ‘philosophical’ (as opposed to confessional) ‘purchase’ of ‘cogito’-like argu-
ments, by contrast, is to formulate subtler and more ‘secular’ ‘experiential’ conceptual
apparatus T which ‘provably’ensure us that ‘we’ exist, and that T ‘makes sense’ in T.
The underlying project of ‘cogito’-like arguments, in other words, is to broaden
conceptual and sensory ‘experience’ so that it ‘validates’ and semantically
‘interprets’ ‘itself ’.
Be that as it may, the relevance of the tacit premise 33 in the case of Descartes’
“cogito” seems to me supported, or at least illustrated, by
34 the centrality of Descartes’ otherwise abstruse (and classically quite ‘dogmatic’)
attempts to secure a ‘criterion of truth’, where ‘truth’ is identified de facto with
‘demonstrability in U’);
35 the tenacity of his efforts to ‘demonstrate’ that the epistemically and ontologically
more ‘perfect’ ‘god’ (or more ‘divine’ ‘theory’ U) does not ‘conceal’ such ‘truths’
from its less comprehensive ‘image and likeness’ T;
and
36 the swift emergence and enduring prominence of debates about the rhetorically
begged ‘Cartesian circle’, construed in the present context as a kind of ‘meta-
verification’ (whose formal counterpart would have to be formulated in a metathe-
ory for U) that [demonstrability of  in U] implies [demonstrability of  in T].
(In the case of 35, for example, the ‘Cartesian circle’ may be paraphrased as a ‘fixed-
point’-assertion that “‘god’ (or U) does not deceive us that [‘god’ (or U) does not
deceive us]”).
In Berkeley’s “master argument”, the “tacit premise” sketched in 18–20 above is
a tacit conflation of
37 what ‘you’ or ‘I ’ or T (may hypothetically be posited or ‘thought’ to) “perceive”
or “conceive” in T (“[that] a tree [‘exists’] with ‘nobody by to perceive it”’);
and
38 what ‘god’ (or U) (presumably) “perceives” or “conceives” about this thought-
experimental framework T (that “you yourself [did] perceive it all the while”).
To see that this ‘tacit premise’ is problematic in Berkeley’s system, recall that a
finite “spirit” can only have a “notion” of (but cannot “perceive” or “conceive”) another
“spirit”’s “perception” or “conception”.
The ‘master argument”s triumphantly adduced auxiliary assumption, therefore—
that “you yourself did perceive it all the while”—may or may not be ‘demonstrable’
in U. But is not even ‘expressible’, much less ‘demonstrable’ in T, on Berkeley’s
own principles. (In quasi-Berkeleyan terms, T might at most have a semantically
underdetermined ‘notional’ ‘sign’ for this ‘second-order’ self-referential assertion.)
The relevant  in the ‘master argument’—which seems to have little intrinsically
to do with “trees”—might also be paraphrased as an assertion that “I” (or “you” or
‘god’) “perceive” or “conceive (something)” (and thereby confer ‘existence’ on it).
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If so, then (‘idealist’) assertions that such ‘intentional’ acts confer ‘existence’ might
be interpreted as natural generalisations of (‘rationalist’) ‘cogito-arguments’.
Berkeley, finally—who acutely critiqued the contradictions implicit in semiformal
attempts to ‘define’ Leibniz’ ‘infinitesimals’ and Newton’s ‘fluxions’—also
39 offered interesting (‘sign’-theoretic) ‘coherentist’ reasons to accept the framework
of Newtonian science, in the form of
40 a grand scheme of intersubjective interpretations between ‘all’ ‘our’ (otherwise
disparate) ‘signs’, “perceptions” and “conceptions” coordinated by his kindly
Anglican god (the ‘design’-argument mentioned earlier).
To the extent Kant acknowledged that (what he called) “Erkenntnis”—which is not
quite the same as ‘knowledge’ (“Wissen”) in German—might ‘presuppose’ secular
forms of intersubjective interpretation between cognitive agents’ ‘Begriffe’ (and did
not simply beg their conceptual or intersubjective ‘Einheit’),
41 there may therefore have been something ‘Berkeleyan’ about the ‘design’-
argument I attributed to Kant in 29 and 30 above; and
42 Berkeley might offer another conceptual bridge from Descartes’ and Leibniz’
‘rationalisme’ to Kant’s “Kritizismus”, despite the latter’s ‘refutation’ of his
“schwärmender Idealismus”.
In the next section, I will consider in some detail the senses in which Kant’s “deduc-
tions” seem to me to fit ‘cogito’-like templates of the sort sketched above.
Here I will close with a suggestion that his ‘transzendentale Methode’ in general
(and the ‘deductions’ in particular) fit another, complementary ‘cogito’-like template,
or prescription: that of an ‘Archimedean’- or ‘fixed-point’ confutation of ‘regressive’
skeptical ‘doubt’.
More precisely, I will attempt to interpret this ‘Methode’ as a ‘dialectical’
43 ‘proof” (in some sense) that (something called) ‘synthetic a priori cognition’ is
a ‘proof ’ (or ‘sufficient reason’, or ‘transcendental’ ‘Archimedean point’) for
[itself ];
or, in more or less equivalent ‘adverbial’ terms, as a collection of roughly cognate
‘proofs’ that
44 cognitive agents synthetically a priori ‘prove’ or ‘determine’ that [cognitive agents
synthetically a priori ‘prove’ or ‘determine’] (cf. the gloss of the ‘Cartesian circle’
following 36 above).
For if not,
45 [cognitive agents fail synthetically a priori to ‘prove’ or ‘determine’ that
[cognitive agents fail synthetically a priori to ‘prove’ or ‘determine’ that
[cognitive agents fail synthetically a priori to ‘prove’ or ‘determine’ that
[cognitive agents fail synthetically a priori to ‘prove’ or ‘determine’ that [ …. ]]]].
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But such a “Regressus” (a ‘descending’ variant of ancient academic skeptics’
‘ascending’ ‘problem of the criterion’) would (Kant believed)
46 render ‘synthetic a priori’ ‘proof’ or ‘determination’ ‘impossible’ (i.e. counter-
factual, Kant’s standard ‘critical’ gloss of ‘impossibility’ in such contexts; cf., e.g.,
B 101, 137 and 628).
But
47 this—Kant argued—would be ‘absurd’. For ‘synthetic priori’ ‘determination’ is
not only regulative (and in this sense ‘possible’). It is also “konstitutiv” (and in
this sense ‘necessary’). For its ‘constitutivity’ is instantiated by the [‘synthetic a
priori’ capacity (Vermögen) to formulate this argument] ….’
In effect, I believe, such a ‘fixed-point’-argument may be construed as an attempt
reconfigure 45’s non-well-founded ‘descent’ into a kind of ‘transcendental circle’, in
which the T of 33 above ‘validates’ T’s ‘experience’ in T. (More of this later.)
In metalogical opposition to such metaphysical ‘circles’ (attempts to ‘collapse’
‘regresses’ such as the one which would otherwise emerge in 36), I will argue in the
next section that
48 notions of ‘doubt’, ‘certainty’, ‘perception’, ‘conception’, knowledge’, ‘synthetic-
ity’, ‘apriority’, ‘cognition’ and ‘determination’, for example, cited earlier—are
‘liminal’, in the sense that they straddle the ‘limines’ or ‘thresholds’ of whatever
they ‘intend’ or ‘qualify’.
In quasi-Kantian terms, one might call them ‘locally’ or (‘situationally’)
“transzendent”. Alternatively, in language Georg Cantor introduced in a letter to
David Hilbert more than a century later, one might call them ‘locally’ or ‘situation-
ally’ “inkonsistent”.
To the extent one can make metalogical counterparts of such notions precise (more
possible than many readers might think), [self]referential attributions of such proper-
ties ‘generate’ ‘semantic paradoxes’ and corresponding patterns of iterated metathe-
oretic ‘ascent’and (what might be called) intentional ‘descent’.
In Kant’s case—and in particular in the allusion to “[this very argument]”
just above—such notions will only be ‘counterfactual’ (or non-‘experiential’).
They will be (‘locally’) transzendente Vernunftideen, or perhaps more accurately
‘Vernunftprädikate’ (predicates of ‘pure reason’).
In plain German: “‘die’ Rahmenbedingungen der Kantischen Argumente über
‘die’ Bedingungen ‘der’ ‘Möglichkeit’ ‘der’ Erfahrung sind lauter Vernunftideen….”
(In even plainer English: “‘the’ boundary-conditions of Kantian arguments about
‘the’ conditions of ‘the’ ‘possibility’ of experience are a bunch of ideas-of-reason….”)
‘Worse’ (or in my view, ‘better’): metatheoretically defined counterparts of such
‘frame’- or ‘boundary-conditions’ will always be ‘locally transzendent’, in relative
terms, with respect to any given ‘level’ of what they (e.g.) ‘doubt’, ‘conceive’, ‘cognise’
or ‘determine’ to ‘be the case’.
In particular, if one tried to ‘halt’, with Kant and his neo-Kantian successors,
the ‘object-theoretic descents’ in 44 and 45—or the ‘metatheoretic ascents’ they
mirrored—in an effort to ‘define’ ‘experience’,
49 the terms in which one claimed to do so would become (locally) ‘transcendent’
with respect to any fixed ‘neo-Kantian’ object-theoretic notion of ‘experience’ one
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might propose,
in the sense that
50 the terms in which one proposed to ‘define’ a given ‘critically’ demarcated notion of
‘experience’ would not only fail to be ‘experiential’; they would be ‘experientially’
inexpressible, and ‘paradoxically’ as well as ‘conceptually’ underdetermined by
what they defined.
4 Reflective inquiry and “das Schicksal der Vernunft”
In this section, I will assimilate the ‘locality’ and essential incompleteness of ‘critical’
inquiry to Kant’s ‘fate of reason’, poignantly characterised above in the opening lines
of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
I will attempt in this section to
1 interpret more carefully the ‘begged’ implication in section 3 for the “‘cogito’-like”
reconstructions of Kant’s ‘transcendental’ method and ‘deductions’;
2 characterise the views and analyses attributed above to Descartes, Berkeley and
Kant as ‘idealisms’ with successively broader and more ‘deductive ranges’ of what
is ‘conceived’ in ‘experiential’ T and ‘higher’ U;
3 offer ‘skeptical’ as well as ‘transcendental’ arguments for assimilation of such
analyses’‘assertions’ and ‘demonstrations’ in T and U to counterparts of them in
first-order metatheoretical hierarchies;
4 review well-known proofs that metalogical counterparts of the ‘dialectical’ infer-
ences and implications in 3.14 and 3.33 are either ‘locally’ refutable or ‘locally’
inexpressible in such hierarchies’ ‘theoretical frameworks’ T; and
5 adduce (and sketch the proof of) a simple but relevant bit of metalogical ‘folklore’:
that no ‘faithful’ interpretation of a ‘weaker’ theory T can be found in a ‘higher’
theory U which is ‘strong’ enough to prove the consistency of T.
The breadth of the “Rechtmäßigkeit” (cf. B116) Kant associated with “Deduktion”
is well-known, as is the notion’s association with ‘mediated’ forms of reasoning (cf.
B761), and the role of “transzendentaler Deduktion” in the (curiously ‘subsumptive’
or ‘reflective’) “Erklärung der Art, wie sich Begriffe a priori auf Gegenstände beziehen
können” (B117).
In what follows, I will draw in fact on the latter quotation to argue
6 that (ostensibly) more latitudinarian notions of Kantian ‘deduction’ do, after
all, tend to close down on straightforward first-order consequence-relations in
metatheoretical hierarchies which interpret such ‘predication’ and ‘subsumption’;
and that a good way to sustain Kantian ‘critical’ insights (between the ‘T’s and ‘U’s
of Sect. 3, for example) might be to
7 ‘localise’ and iterate them, in the form of ‘locally critical’ theory/metatheory
distinctions;
8 exploit them as generators of ‘heuristic’ notions of object- and concept-formation
in the metatheoretic hierarchies they generate; and
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9 interpret their unending extensions and ramifications in such hierarchies as ‘reg-
ulative’ traces and counterparts of Kant’s “fate of reason” (“Schicksal der Ver-
nunft”).
I suggested earlier that Kantian or quasi-Kantian reconstructions of the generic
‘cogito’-like assertions  in Sect. 3 might be
10 (‘metaphysically’ ‘deductive’) claims that ‘the’ ‘completeness’ and ‘unity’ of
‘forms of intuition’ and ‘categories of the understanding’ ‘determine’ (or ‘con-
stitute’) T and its ‘unique’ isomorphic counterparts in ‘experience’; and
11 roughly cognate ‘transcendentally’ ‘deductive’ claims that ‘the’ ‘completeness’
and ‘transzendentale Einheit” of ‘intuition’ and ‘understanding’ ‘determine’ (or
‘constitute’) T and its ‘unique’ isomorphic counterparts in ‘experience’.
I also suggested that all of the four ‘cogito-like’ arguments outlined in Sect. 3
decompose into
12 (relatively uninteresting) ‘demonstrations’ that interpretations of ‘thought’, ‘per-
ception’ and ‘conception’ in T (may) ‘exist’ in ‘higher-order’ frameworks U; and
13 (interesting but begged) ‘demonstrations’ that corresponding interpretations of
‘thought’, ‘perception’ and ‘conception’ in T (‘must’) ‘exist’ in the ‘experiential’
framework T.
In his ‘metaphysical’ and ‘transcendental’ variants of these arguments in the Ana-
lytik, Kant sought to work in a resolutely secular U, and dispense with conceptual
‘mathematical’ and ‘dynamical’ ‘physicotheological’ arguments in his ‘constitutive’
rationales for the “transcendental unity” of “Erkenntnis” to “Erfahrung”.
Yet he insisted over and over again in the Dialektik of the first Critique that the
“systematic unity”of ‘Reason’ at KdrV, B692—the theoretical framework I have called
U—‘must’ remain a ‘merely regulative’ but conceptually significant “Aufgabe”, an
Ideal which zieht uns hinan (so to speak) at the marginal horizons of such (scientific)
‘experience’.
Logicians familiar with the semantic purchase of (relatively) ‘higher-order metathe-
ories’ such as U know that part of this ‘purchase’ is their ‘ability’ to ‘define’ ‘internally
canonical’ interpretations of ‘weaker’ subtheories such as T, and it is in that sense
that such U may be ‘locally’ ‘strong’ enough to account for ‘scientific’ ‘boundary-
conditions’ of ‘experience’ and ‘experiment(ation)’.
But they also know, on the evidence of Gödel’s results, if nothing else (cf. the proof
of 38 below) that
14 the ‘strength’ of such theories is ‘theory-relative’ (or at least theory-mediated’)—
if one stipulates that U is ‘(intrinsically) stronger’ than T iff U proves the con-
sistency of T, the (nonlinear) ordering of such ‘strength’ is neither reflexive nor
symmetric.
In particular, the [self]-sufficiency (and implicit [self]-validation) of Laplace’s
famous remark (quoted third-hand in Victor Hugo’s autobiography) that “[s]ire, je
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n’avait pas besoin de cette hypothèse(-la)” might therefore have to be more carefully
calibrated than Laplace knew.
If all Laplace meant was that he had no ‘need’ of (secular or numinous) versions
of (what Kant called) “the unconditioned” (“das Unbedingte”), he was quite right.
But if he (or Kant) meant
15 that his own or anyone else’s intelligible formalisations of mathematics or math-
ematical physics could uniquely ‘determine’ their own (mathematical or concep-
tual) boundary-conditions, much less their own ‘intended’ semantics,
he was subtly but deeply wrong (and Descartes, Berkeley and Kant with him).
In the sequel, therefore, I will also continue to interpret
16 Kant’s ‘transcendental deductions’ as failed attempts to find such an ‘Archimedean
point’ of [self]-validation on the rasor’s edge between Newtonian science and its
elusive ‘hypotheses’ (which Newton had tried to disavow); and
17 the second and third Critique’s qualifications and relativisations of such claims as
tacit admissions that his efforts to locate this ‘transcendental’ limit had turned out
to be more ‘problematic’ (a Kantian term of art) than he had hoped.
Whatever the merits of Sect. 3’s “‘cogito’-like arguments”, therefore, the tacit petitio
of their claims that
18 [demonstrability of semantic assertions  about T in U] ‘followed’ from
[demonstrability of such semantic assertions  about T in T]
remained present in Kant’s Architektonik.
In the remarks following 13 in this section, I appealed to analogies with metalogical
hierarchies which have run in the background throughout the essay’s first two sections,
and it is past time to offer the rationale for these analogies.
It would follow from the heuristic principles I have sketched that no one—on pain of
circularity or semantic paradox—could claim to offer a ‘hypothesis-free’ ‘deduction’
that first-order ‘deductions’ (much less metatheoretical hierarchies which employ it)
are ‘canonical’.
One can, however, offer ‘skeptical’ variants of Kant’s ‘critical’ or ‘transcendental
analysis’ which suggest that ‘eventual’ recourse to first-order theories in ‘ramified’
metatheoretical hierarchies may be ineluctable.
The ‘analysis’ I have in mind is
19 ‘skeptical’ in that it ‘suspends judgment’ between (alternative interpretations of)
‘abstract logics’ and their ‘consequence relations’;
20 ‘critical’ in that it postulates (on pain of semantic paradox) theory/metatheory-
distinctions to ‘make (syntactical) sense’ of such interpretations;
21 ‘transcendental’ in that recurrent theory/metatheory-distinctions of this sort ‘reg-
ulate’ (but do not ‘determine’) (semantic) efforts to assert such alternative inter-
pretations’ ‘existence’;
22 ‘eventual’ in that such interpretive predications of semantic ‘existence’ may ‘even-
tually’ and ‘economically’ be adjudicated in first-order metatheoretic set- or class-
theories;
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23 ‘ramified’ in that ‘partial’ interpretations of any ‘intelligible’ theories which
‘encode’ their own syntax and ‘consequence-relations’ in ‘inductive’ ways branch
without limit;
and finally
24 ‘ineluctable’ in that ‘all’ sufficiently ‘finitary’ theories introduced to examine and
interpret other theories in such hierarchies are semantically indistinguishable from
first- order counterparts, by a remarkable theorem of Per Lindström.
In somewhat plainer English:
25 the simplest and most ‘natural’ way to understand abstruse theoretical frameworks
in metatheoretical hierarchies is to interpolate set- or class-theories which interpret
them;
26 ‘intelligible’ set- or class-theories which satisfy ‘finitarity’-conditions are seman-
tically indiscernible (via Lindström’s theorem) from their first-order counterparts;
27 hierarchies of recursively axiomatisable first-order languages offer flexible, com-
municable and ontologically neutral ‘common languages’ and frameworks of inter-
pretation for ‘rational’discourse;
and finally,
28 such languages’ ‘ontological neutrality’(cf. 27) and ‘skeptical’ ‘suspension of
judgment’ (cf. 19) offer ‘natural’ conceptual interpretations of Kantian “Reinheit”
and “apriority”, as well as physicists’ (equally elusive) ideals of ‘controlled exper-
imentation’ and ‘experimental isolation’.
There are many reasons, of course. to dismiss such analogical conjectures and
‘skeptical transcendental arguments’ out of hand.
The first is that ‘ordinary language’ is ‘obviously’ not first-order, so claims that ‘it’
‘is’ are absurdly and obviously reductive.
Of course ‘ordinary language’ is not first-order, at any given level of (potential)
syntactic and semantic interpretation.
My conjectures in 19–24 above—which I clearly cannot ‘prove’ (‘Chinese rooms’
are lurking about here somewhere)—are
29 that the limitless syntactical and semantic complexities of ‘ordinary linguistic’
usages may be interpretable in comparably limitless syntactical and semantic
complexities of first-order hierarchies; (‘hand over hand’, so to speak); and
30 that ‘sufficiently’ skilled speakers of ‘ordinary languages’ often improvise ‘locally’
adequate finitary substructures of such hierarchies in ‘real time’ (otherwise—as
non-native speakers well know—their interlocutors will ‘give up’ on them).
A second objection is that one has seen unconvincing versions of such views
before—in the writings of logical positivists, for example, or in ‘Quinean’ assertions
that ‘everything’ ‘can be expressed’ in ‘set theory’.
On the account I wish to defend, ‘experience’—including linguistic experience—is
certainly much broader than anything I am aware of in the writings of logical positivists.
It is also broader than “set theory”, or at least any particular set theory.
For ‘set theories’ (in my view at least) are just ontologically neutral way-stations
for attempts to talk about ‘predication’—what Kant would have called “Subsumtion”,
or “das Besondere als enthalten unter dem Allgemeine zu denken” in B XXVI and B
XXXII of the third Critique.
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And ‘critical’ theory/metatheory distinctions, I would argue, are inevitable con-
comitants of attempts to iterate such ‘predication’, and heuristic metatheories can be
interpolated in such iterations almost at will.
Such iterations occur ‘naturally’ in hierarchies of ‘stronger’ (possibly non-first-
order) metatheories, with the proviso that assertions about such metatheories’ consis-
tency are ‘liminal’ and remain open to further (‘skeptical’) inquiry.
The most ‘natural’ way to clarify such consistency-questions, in turn, is to seek
semantic interpretations for them in yet-‘stronger’ theories of ‘predication’. And the
simplest and most ‘natural’ venues for such searches are ‘stronger’ as well as linguis-
tically augmented first-order set-theories.
Russell’s early type-hierarchies were ‘linear’ and begged questions about ‘the’
limits of their ‘types’ in ways which were anticipated by his own paradox and Cantor’s
observations about ‘Inkonsistenz’, and were clarified later by metalogical observations
of Skolem, Gödel and Henkin.
Wondrously subtle refinements of such hierarchies have been and will continue
to be devised. But the more open and flexible they were, the more ‘natural’ their
interpretations in the aforementioned linguistically enhanced set-theories became.
Such remarks are obviously ‘heuristic’ and subject to correction and revision. But
they may make a provisional case for a conjecture outlined earlier: that ‘everything’ we
talk about and endeavor to interpret ‘is’ (or ‘may as well be’) ‘eventually’ first-order.
In defense of this heuristic conjecture, finally, I would
31 appeal again to the openness, generality and intensional interpolability of metathe-
oretic hierarchies, given that extensional canvasses of potentially infinite evidence
are beyond finitary “seekers”’ ken; and
32 appeal finally to their pragmatic utility, in ‘ordinary’ as well as metaphysi-
cal‘discourse’, as naturally ‘interleaved’ venues for critique and interpretation
of everyday ‘intentionality’.
(My favorite thumbnail-critique of this sort is Wittgenstein’s (1972) uncharacter-
istically disarming remark in Über Gewißheit (ÜG, 12), that “[m]an vergißt eben
immer den Ausdruck ‘Ich glaubte, ich wüßte es’” (“one always forgets the expression
‘I thought I knew”’….)
The ‘subreptively’ self-referential problem Kant sought to solve may be charac-
terised as follows.
A genuinely ‘a priori’ ‘Deduktion’ would have to be
33 a conceptually idealised or ‘isolated’ (thought)-‘experiment’, independent of ‘all’
‘experience’ and ‘all’ ‘external’ (‘merely empirical’) verification;
34 a ‘deductive’ act (in accordance with some sort of generalised ‘consequence’-
relation) invariant under ‘all’ changes of metatheoretic boundary-conditions;
and most ‘problematically’ (once again)
35 a ‘fixed point’, ‘Archimedean point’ or ‘self -validating’ ‘demonstration’ (in the
sense once again of some sort of generalised ‘consequence’ relation), with respect
to ‘all’ attempts to ‘refute’ it or ‘call it into question’.
(It might also be assumed to ‘prove’ its own [‘provability’]—a curiously unprob-
lematic assumption in metalogical contexts, as Löb observed (cf. Smorynski 1977,
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p. 845), but one which also turns out to have little ‘transcendental’ force or proof-
theoretic purchase).
What it could not ‘prove’, or even ‘express’, remained, as before, its own ‘exis-
tence’, ‘interpretability’ or ‘consistency’, much less the ‘necessity’ of the ‘possibility’
of its own ‘existence’, ‘interpretability’ or ‘consistency’…. (Kant’s cogent observa-
tions about the ontological ambiguity of ‘existence’ might be more relevant to ‘tran-
scendental’ analyses than he realised).
To the extent such ‘proofs’ were truly ‘isolated’, for example, ‘we’ could not even
adduce stable thought-experimental evidence to ‘prove’ that they would not also be
nonstandard (in quasi-Kantian jargon, that non-well-founded “intensive Größen”—
metalogical counterparts of Hume’s ‘problem of induction’—might occur in their
formulation).
I will conclude this section with a brief semiformal sketch of the ‘folklore’-result
promised above in 1.17 and 4.5, which may clarify the nature of the barriers devisers of
philosophical ‘cogito’-like arguments have faced. I’ve elided inductive definitions and
blurred notational distinctions to simplify the exposition, but any competent logician
can bring them into sharper focus.
The definitions first. A ‘syntactical interpretation’ E of a (not necessarily first-
order) theory T in another theory U is a systematic translation of formulae ϕ of T into
counterparts ϕE in U such that
36 [T proves ϕ ] (metatheoretically) implies that [U proves ϕE] in TE,
where TE is the collection of such translates ϕE for ϕ in T.
Such a syntactical interpretation E is faithful if and only if
37 [T proves ϕ ] if and only if [U proves ϕE] for all ϕ in T.
Since the ‘begged’ metatheoretical assumptions of Sect. 3’s ‘cogito-like’ arguments
asserted that the identity translation faithfully interprets T in U, the following may be
relevant.
38 Proposition.
Suppose T is a consistent first-order theory which syntactically interprets Peano’s
arithmetic, and U is a (metatheoretically) ‘stronger’ consistent theory which proves
that [T is consistent]. Then no syntactical interpretation E of T in U faithfully interprets
the assertion that [T is consistent] in U.
Proof (Sketch)
Suppose (for contradiction) that a given syntactical interpretation E did faithfully inter-
pret the assertion that [T is consistent] in U. Then [T is consistent] would be provable
in U, by hypothesis, and the biconditionals [[T is consistent] iff [TE is consistent] iff
[T is consistent]E] would also be provable in U, by a series of inductive arguments.
So
39 [T is consistent]E would be provable in U.
But it is a consequence of Gödel’s original incompleteness results (cf. Bell and
Machover 1977, or Smorynski, pp. 821–865), that [T is consistent] is not provable in
the theory T.
The assumption that E is faithful and the remarks in the first paragraph would
therefore yield that
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40 [T is consistent]E is not provable in U,
so we have derived a (metatheoretic) contradiction from the assumption that such a
faithful interpretation E of T into U exists.
The informal originals of the assertions in the proposition made informal semantic
claims—in ‘ordinary languages’ (whatever they are)—about “existence”, “interpreta-
tion” and “conceivability” of ‘experiential’ frameworks, and I have assimilated such
frameworks to formal theories T.
‘Analytic realists’ who dismiss such assimilations would presumably argue that
such assimilations are inapt (‘category-mistakes’, so to speak)—that “analogy” and
“assimilation”, for example, are not “identity”.
(The ancient skeptics’ response to this particular argument was that ‘we’ might not
be able to discern the difference—arguably an anticipation of ‘equivalence-class’-
arguments employed in the proof of Leon Henkin’s completeness-theorem (Chang
and Keisler 1973/1972, pp. 61–67)).
I would respond that the intense eristic attention devoted to Descartes’ ‘cogito’,
Berkeley’s ‘master argument’ and Kant’s ‘deduction(s)’ tacitly suggests that they were
41 the most vulnerable as well as ‘ambitious’ thought-experiments in their authors’
work,
to which I have added a sustained argument that
42 the premises ‘begged’ in their ‘proofs’ and ‘deductions’ become refutable in rea-
sonable metalogical counterparts.
In the case at hand, moreover:
43 the notions of syntactical interpretation I have introduced are rather broad (they
apply to theories which are not necessarily first-order, for example);
44 there are ‘good (metalogical) reasons’ to assimilate the ‘semantic’ claims of the
informal assertions  to consistency-assertions about first-order counterparts of
such T; and
45 ‘skeptically transcendental’ arguments for the recurrence of first-order interpre-
tation in ‘ramified’ metatheoretical hierarchies offer correlative ‘good reasons’ to
consider the methodological relevance of such constructions.
I will finish in the same spirit with a final ‘heuristic’ argument (which may be all
an honest skeptic should try to offer).
As I’ve suggested earlier, two interrelated hypotheses have animated this essay: that
46 ‘precise’ ‘transcendental’ assertions of [self]-validation are “transcendental illu-
sions”;
and that
47 semantic paradoxes and metalogical analyses devised to accommodate them have
hermeneutic value as thought-experimental refinements of their metaphysical and
epistemological ancestors.
Such ‘hypotheses’—along with their companion-of-the-route, the “metalogical
turn” postulated above in 1.1–1.3—cannot be ‘proved’. Measured against [their own]
criteria, they may be partially and provisionally sustained, but they will never be
‘conclusively’ (much less ‘ultimately’) ‘secured’.
But these reflections suggest two more hypotheses. The third is that
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48 critical awareness itself (and in particular critical [self]-awareness) may be a
(‘merely regulative’) value, and Keats’ “negative capability” (Keats, p. 277) one
of its marks.
Such an ‘awareness’, for example, might (partially) reconcile
49 the apparent incompleteness of Kant’s ‘practical reason’ with the underdetermi-
nation of its ‘speculative’ counterpart;
50 the ‘regulative Ideen’ of Kant’s ‘moral law within us’ with our ‘desires’ to ‘under-
stand’ the ‘starry heaven above us’; and
51 the Würde and SchicksaI of Kant’s “reasonable beings” (“vernünftige Wesen”),with
the ‘dignity’ and ‘fate’ of Pascal’s roseaux pensants (“thinking reeds”) in a
“univers” which “n’en sait rien”.
The last hypothesis is that
52 ideals of ‘heuristic’ inquiry and ‘intelligible’ verification and concept-formation
may be preconditions for ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ and mutual ‘respect’;
and therefore that
53 recourses to such ‘merely’ regulative ideals may be ‘reasonable beings” cradle
gifts as well as their ‘fate(s)’.
5 Reflective inquiry and ‘Das’ Reich ‘der’ Zwecke
Consider the following (fairly representative) passage, taken from a section in the
second Critique entitled:
Wie eine Erweiterung der reinen Vernunft in praktischer Absicht, ohne
damit ihre Erkenntnis als spekulativ zugleich zu erweitern, zu denken
möglich sei.…
Hier werden sie [praktische Ideen, wie Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit, Gott und das
höchste Gut] immanent und konstitutiv, indem sie Gründe der Möglichkeit sind,
das notwendige Objekt der reinen Praktischen Vernunft (das höchste Gut) wirk-
lich zu machen, da sie ohne dies transzendent und bloß regulative Prinzipien der
spekulativen Vernunft sind, die ihr nicht ein neues Objekt über die Erfahrung
hinaus anzunehmen, sondern nur ihren Gebrauch in der Erfahrung der Voll-
ständigkeit zu nähern auferlegen.
KdpV, B 241, 244
(last emphasis mine)
How an Extension of Pure Reason in Practical Intention is Possible to Be
Thought, without at the Same Time extending its Cognition as Specula-
tive.…
Here they [practical ideas, such as freedom, immortality, god and the highest
good] become immanent and constitutive, in that they are grounds of the possi-
bility for making the necessary object of pure practical reason (the highest good)
real, since without this they are transcendent and merely regulative principles of
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speculative reason, which impose on it not the obligation to accept a new object
beyond experience, but only to bring its use in experience closer to completeness.
Such appeals to “transcendent and merely regulative principles” provided later
commentators and metaphysicians with a textual basis for assorted ‘two-truths’-
interpretations of Kantian metaphysics, and the late-nineteenth century Kant-scholar
Hans Vaihinger, in particular, with one of the prototypes for his “Philosophie des Als
Ob” (the most striking basis for such readings may perhaps be found in KdU, 1974
§76, B 339–344).
In the first Critique, Kant employed such “merely regulative principles” as ladders
to ‘higher’ forms of ‘truth’ (cf., e.g., B 83–87, 185, 269 and 670). But he never explicitly
acknowledged—except for the Dialectic-passages devoted to ‘intelligible causes’ (cf.
KdrV, B366 ff.) (‘critical’ counterparts, so to speak, of epicurean ‘swerves’)—that
1 ‘practical’ recourse to regulative/constitutive distinctions might shift the ground of
‘speculative’ (scientific) ‘experience’,
or (in the jargon of the last section) that
2 ‘scientific’ experience might not be ‘faithfully’ interpreted in wider ‘regulative’
frames for its ‘conscious’ ‘practical’ extensions (“…without at the same time extend-
ing its cognition as speculative.…”).
In the opening section’s ‘potted history’, I also
3 canvassed straightforward implications of the neo-Kantian observation that many
“new objects” (and “new relations”) have become part of ‘experience’ in mathe-
matics and mathematical physics, and
4 suggested that metalogical margins of ‘experience’ and its thought-experimental
counterparts might someday—‘should’ someday, if our descendants have the
wisdom for it—encompass patterns of recurrently metatheoretical ‘object’- and
concept-formation undreamt of in Kant’s philosophy (or mine).
Such arguments and the semantic pluralism which underlie them suggest alterna-
tive readings for certain remarks in the passage quoted above, and skeptical inter-
pretations, in particular, for ‘practical’ aspects of Kant’s monist assumptions about
‘immanent’/’transcendent’- and ‘constitutive’/‘regulative’-dichotomy.
Suppose one accepted, for example that ‘local’ claims of ‘speculative’, ‘practical’ or
‘teleological’ ‘completeness’ (Kant’s “Vollständigkeit”) are only ‘locally’ expressible,
in essentially incomplete and therefore plurally interpretable metatheories.
Then
5 the ‘ladders’ mentioned earlier—an ancient skeptical image which appeared in the
pyrrhonist writings of Sextus Empiricus (cf. 1976, M VIII, p. 481), and reappeared in
Wittgenstein’s ‘dogmatic’ Tractatus—might branch and diverge ‘forever’ in plurally
interpretable metatheoretic patterns; and
6 the ‘practical’ remarks in KdpV, B 241 and 244 and ‘teleological’ counterparts of
them in KdU, B 301, 342 and 344 ff.) might begin to resemble ancient skeptical
claims to engage in ‘dialectical’ (and plurally interpretable) speculation “adox-
asto¯s”—“undogmatically”, “undoctrinally”, and “not in the manner of the dogma-
tists” (cf., e. g., Sextus Empiricus, 1976, PH I, 24/16).
In what follows, I will argue
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7 that the principal bar to such ‘skeptical’ readings of Kant’s non-skeptical texts is
his assumption that the ‘hierarchies’ of his ‘constitutive’/’regulative’ and ‘imma-
nent’/’transcendent’ distinctions have exactly two levels;
8 that Kant worked with ‘speculative’, ‘practical’ and ‘teleological’ counterparts of
this linear two-stage ascent as a ground-bass in an extraordinary variety of asser-
tions about ‘die’ Grenzbestimmung zwischen Immanenz und Transzendenz (cf., e.g.,
Prolegomena, 1976, pp. 350–362 and KdrV, B 786); and
9 that this ‘capped’, two-stage linearity of Kant’s had an obvious historical prece-
dent: the ‘cave parable’, the most influential account of ‘practical’ and ‘epistemic’
perspective-shift ever written, in which Plato simply assumed that emergence from
‘the’ cave would take place only once, in one ‘direction’, and would never be iter-
ated.
In Kant’s case, as well as Plato’s, why?
Why did Plato and Kant, both of whom seemed to countenance other sorts of ‘infini-
tum’ and ‘indefinitum’ readily enough, reject stages of semantic (re)interpretation and
hermeneutic reflection out of hand?
Why did both assume there was only one ‘line’, or ‘ladder’, or ‘form of the good’,
or ‘realm of ends’, when partial realisations of noetic enlightenment would have
accorded equally well with the ‘conversational’ and self-‘critical’ aspects of Socratic
dialektike¯ and Kant’s ‘Dialektik’?
Why, above all, did both construe epistemic, metaphysical and practical ‘truth’ and
‘goodness’ as second-order templates, rather than hierarchies of relational interpre-
tations elucidated in ‘heuristic’ metatheories (or ‘caves’ illuminated by ‘heuristic’
‘suns’)?
In the case of Kant’s ‘critical’ work in general, and his ‘practical’ philosophy
in particular, the answer, I believe, had little to do with his alleged temperamental
preoccupations with ‘duty’ and dour fascination with unitary ‘law’. He was a kindly
teacher and brilliant conversationalist, who enjoyed musical entertainment and held
down a place at his local Stammtisch (when he could afford it).
If Kant felt a deeper sense of philosophical ‘duty’ or ‘commitment’, it was to ‘hier-
atic’ philosophical traditions which enjoin the sorts of unicity and canonicity of inter-
pretation I have assimilated to nominally secular ‘design-arguments’.
I have already argued that certain scientific (‘speculative’) counterparts of such
arguments are metalogically untenable efforts to finesse the ‘fate’ of ‘ontological’ and
epistemological ‘reason’.
Here I would suggest that such arguments are indeed more untenable—
10 not because ethical and ‘practical’ ‘experience(s)’ and (thought-)experiments are
less complex than their scientific counterparts, but because they are vastly more
so.
(Consider, for example, that
11 ethicists are expected to acknowledge the potential “relevance” of illimitable com-
plex “initial” and “boundary” conditions to moral “experience”,
whereas
12 scientists are expected to require that experiments (“expériences” in French) be as
“simple” (or at least “controlled”, “isolated” and “replicable”) as possible.)
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In both cases, therefore (but a fortiori in the ‘realm’ of ‘the practical’),
13 “intelligibility” and heuristic [self]-reference (however incomplete) are ‘regula-
tive’ ‘preconditions’ of forms of communication and [self]-understanding worthy
of the names.
The ‘regulative’ force of such ideals of processive inquiry—without an aware-
ness that such inquiry must be ramified if it is to be ‘intelligible’—clearly ani-
mated Descartes’, Berkeley’s and Kant’s hopes that ‘design’-based ‘uniqueness-of-
maximality-and-determination’-arguments might be ‘provable’;
But it could also provide a framework—mindful of the greater ‘depth’ evoked in
10 above—for
14 acceptance of ‘localised’ forms of Kant’s ‘Primat des Praktischen’, but rejection
of ‘the’ inexpressible ‘unicity’ of his ‘Reich der Zwecke’ (‘realm of ends’).
The rest of the section will be given over to an attempt to outline such a ‘regulative’
and ‘experiential’ interpretation of Kant’s Primat, in which significant notions of
‘Zweck(e)’ and ‘Autonomie” will never ‘converge’ to or eventuate in a unique moral
or teleological ‘Reich’.
On my account, the ‘primacy of the practical’ reflects
15 a ‘natural’ desire to interpret one’s experience in something ‘deeper’; more ‘con-
scious’; more ‘contemplative’ (cf. ‘Aristotle’s theoretikon’ (1975/1977; 1975));
and more ‘comprehensive’ (and compréhensive); and
16 an ‘autonomously’ self-imposed obligation to ‘respect’ that desire in other “rea-
sonable” (or at least “sentient”) beings which ‘experience’ it, in the sense that
they can propose and test counterfactual’ ‘purposes’ (“Zwecke”) they hope might
‘realise’ (or ‘fulfill’) it.
17 An “end” or “purpose”, in this ‘practically’ shifted context, is simply a (syn-
tactically or semantically) interpretable object-theoretic assertion (the German
‘Sachverhalt’).
18 A “maxim” (“Maxime”) is simply an object-theoretic assertion that certain object-
theoretic ‘means’ or actions imply or ‘bring about’ a particular end.
19 A (moral) “law” (“Gesetz”), finally, is a modal as well as an (intelligible) metathe-
oretic assertion that certain ‘means’ or actions ‘should ’imply (or ‘morally entail’)
a particular object-theoretic ‘end’.
In “Virtual Modality” (2003b), I defined an adequate ‘virtual’ semantics for alethic
modal assertions in a given theory T, in which ‘worlds’ WT are boolean-valued
extensions of an ‘initial’ placeholder-‘world’ ‘generated’ by a ‘virtual’ structure which
interprets T.
For what it is worth, one could define deontological refinements of such alethic
semantics which could be fitted with deontological refinements which would single
out
20 ‘practical’ subclasses WT of such ‘worlds’ or ‘realm of ends’ WT,
characterised by “reasonable” constraints on the ‘permissibility’ or ‘proportionality’
of means and ‘legitimacy’ recognised in them, and in which ‘reality’ ‘would’ be as it
‘ought’ to be (by the lights of WT).
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The ranges of each such class WT of counterfactual ‘deontological’ interpretations
would be
21 metatheoretic with respect to the first-order set-theory in which the ‘virtual’ modal
T mentioned above is interpreted;
and
22 metametatheoretic with respect to the original theory T, in which quasi-Rawlsian
‘ends’ or ‘purposes’ might ‘initially’ be identified and debated,
but the semantic intricacies of such a deontological ‘stratification’ might reflect the
illimitable complexities associated with the “primacy of the practical” above.
But is conspicuously, notoriously (and perhaps inevitably) absent from any ‘deon-
tological’ refinements of modal sematics (the one sketched earlier or any other) which
are guidelines for ‘choices’ of the hypothetical classes WT.
I will devote the rest of the section therefore to an impredicative effort to sketch a
few minimal and incomplete criteria which ‘ought’ to be met by such ‘realms’, and
argue on good skeptical grounds (and close alignment in this case with Kant) that more
‘complete’ decision-procedures would be ‘inexpressible’ in the theoretical contexts to
which they applied.
Consider, for example, the following (rough) ‘marks’ of ‘awareness’, in ascending
order of metatheoretic complexity.
23 It is a mark (indeed a characterisation) of a well-defined (idealised) Turing machine
that it can implement object-theoretically feasible and well-demarcated ‘induction-
schemes’ of inferences, and ‘know’, in this sense, ‘how to go on’ with them.
24 It is a mark of epistemic ‘intelligence’ to ‘understand’ metatheoretically (and
perhaps even ‘know’) that one does not ‘know how to go on’ with respect to indefi-
nitely extendible ranges of such (more and more complexly defined metatheoretic)
schemes.
25 It is a ‘deeper’ and more ‘zetetic’ (‘searching’) mark of metatheoretic ‘insight’
to search (perhaps in vain) for ‘reasons why’ we do not ‘know how to go on’;
make attempts to extend or modify such schemes (or ‘theories’); and propose new
‘characterisations’ of them in other (more complexly schematic) ‘metatheories’.
26 It is a still deeper and more ‘zetetic’ mark of sentience, ethical insight and quasi-
Kantian ‘reasonable faith’ to seek to understand why and when ‘we’ ‘should’ and
‘should not’ ‘be expected to’ ‘know how to go on’ with our attempts to query
and refine current schemes; and formulate (in full awareness of our limited moral
and conceptual capacities) quasi-Kantian practical ‘Gebote’ (‘commandments’ or
moral ‘injunctions’).
The principle such “Gebot” might be called Pascal’s imperative: to
27 value ‘sentience’ and its preconditions, and ‘respect’ ‘cognitive agents’ enmeshed
in its dilemmas;
and
28 attribute to such sentient agents ‘rights’ and ‘responsibilities’—to the best of ‘our’
abilities and ‘theirs’ (cf. 24 above)—as (potentially) ‘reasonable beings’ in need
of mutual aid.
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(We often seem to forget the obvious: not only do ‘we’ not ‘know how to go on’—
‘we’ do not go on.)
If certain actions clearly seem to be incompatible with the ‘respect’ and its ‘attri-
butions’ just invoked, we have (‘autonomous’) duties to abjure them, if nothing within
‘our’ physical or conceptual horizon constrains us.
And if—by parity of reasoning, so to speak—such forms of ‘respect’ and their
‘attributions’ clearly seem to entail certain actions or resorts to particular means, we
have equally ‘autonomous’ duties to carry them out.
Exactly because these deliberations are autonomous, however—‘legislated’ by an
elusive and underdetermined ‘self’—they do not have sharp metatheoretic boundaries,
and their conceptual horizons elude our view (cf. Leibniz’ hypothesis that “[c]haque
âme connaît l’infini, connaît tout, mais confusément ….”, in the “Principles of Nature
and of Grace”, GVI, 604).
Metatheoretically nuanced efforts to interpret aspects of ‘experience’ may extend
them, and even “bring …[them] closer to completeness” in this sense. But if they are
intelligible—and in that sense communicable—they will not be able to ‘determine’
‘ultimate’ boundary-conditions of practical experience.
What endeavors to ‘prescribe’, in short, cannot itself be ‘ultimately’ ‘prescribed’.
What ‘it’ can do (and ‘should’ do), is (try to) enjoin itself to (try to) be more compre-
hensive (and compréhensif).
One could, of course, attempt dogmatically to assert the ‘existence’ of an—
essentially indefinable—EA notion of (‘human’) consciousness—a sort of intentional
‘last metatheory’, of the sort mentioned earlier.
But the arguments offered in prior sections suggest that such a ‘consciousness’
could not express, much less ‘know’ what [it itself] is, much less ‘know’ with sovereign
certainty that the thing behind the curtain is not [it].
(For a first indication that something like this might be inevitable, consider the
‘impredicative’ nature of attempts to sketch criteria which ‘ought’ to be met by
‘criteria’—such as the ‘WT’ sketched earlier—of what ‘ought’ to be countenanced.)
There are, in short, meta-deontological counterparts of ‘autological’ dilemmas, and
there is no reason to believe that they can be finessed or (‘ethically’) suppressed.
Kant, for example—to his credit—essentially acknowledged, in the Grundlegung
der Metaphysik der Sitten, that a “purely good will” is indefinable and indiscernible
in human experience (cf., e.g., Gr, 1965, pp. 459–463).
This seems to me methodologically right, on the analogies I have sketched. But the
arguments of prior sections suggest (at least to me) that no metatheoretically stable
Analogon of a ‘transcendental deduction’ which would ensure a will’s ‘existence’—
even ‘regulatively’—could be formulated.
They also suggest another, somewhat more oblique analogy, between traditional
theodicies and Kant’s so-called ascription-problem—the ambiguities that arise when
one tries to choose among various initial and boundary-conditions for particular appli-
cations of ‘the’ categorical imperative.
For Kant felt compelled to acknowledge that the activities and ‘motives’ of the good
will, and its operative “Prinzip”, the categorical imperative, may be unsurveyable and
(internally) indefinable, so that he could postulate for it the utter detachment from
merely empirical and hypothetical (‘internal’) ectypes that Leibniz sought in his ‘god’.
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This may sound less surprising, if one reformulates this putative ‘analogy’ as fol-
lows.
Aristotle, Anselm, Aquinas, Leibniz and others wished to ‘ground’ (or end) ‘merely’
relational regresses—of origination, design and conception, for example—in the
(allegedly) reflexive [self]-origination, [self]-design and [self]-conception of ‘god’,
along the lines sketched in prior sections.
Kant, by contrast, wished to employ ‘practical’ [self]-referential or fixed-point argu-
ments to ‘ground’ (end) certain other ‘merely’ relational regresses—of actuation,
purpose-seeking and other-directed Heteronomie—in the (alleged) [self]-actuation,
[Selbst]zweck and [Auto]nomie of the noumenal Wille, and its equally noumenal
Prinzip.
He sought, in other words, to provide in his ethics (among many other things) a
‘first cause’-argument for a “religion of humanity” (or ‘ultimate’ “purpose than which
no more ultimate purpose can be conceived”).
This analogy may help explain why most of us find something numinous but thor-
oughly indeterminate in the resonant language of Kant’s supposedly so affectless
ethics.
It might also help explain why Wöllner, Woltersdorff and the other opportunist and
fundamentalist Zensoren Seiner Durchlaucht Friedrich Wilhelms II went after him
with such ferocity in the 1790s, after he published Religion innerhalb der Grenzen
der bloßen Vernunft.
Along with many others, I find the ideal of a Kantian Reich der Zwecke—and its
more conceptually accessible Rawlsian counterpart—moving and ‘liminally’ persua-
sive.
But the culture-bound rigidity and parochiality of the notorious four ‘applica-
tions’ Kant offered in the Grundlegung for the first two versions of the categorical
imperative—not to mention the even more notorious strains in his late essay “Über
ein vermeintliches Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen”—seem to require suspension
of judgment, and a measure of (what might be called) noetic restraint.
For the very reflexivity of Kant’s ‘Selbstzweck(e)’, ‘Selbstgesetzgebung’ and reine
Selbsttätigkeit (pure self-activity or -actuation, the quality Aristotle attributed to theo-
ria; cf. Gr, p. 452) poses a (literal) dilemma: ‘practical’ Grenzideen, on the analyses
of the foregoing sections, are either
(i) indiscernible to themselves (and therefore of little ‘practical’ use); or
(ii) plurally interpretable in ethically defensible ‘realms’ of branching ‘Zweck-
mäßigkeiten ohne (‘ultimate’) Zweck’.
Such dilemmas would not be surprising if one construed Kant’s ‘deduction’ of prac-
tical Autonomie (self-lawgiving; cf., e.g., Gr, pp. 453–454) as an ‘individualisation’
of traditional ‘first’- and ‘self-cause’-characterisations of ‘god’, or at least
(iii) “[etwas] zu aller Reihen der Bedingungen notwendig …Unbedingtes, mithin auch
eine sich gänzlich von selbst bestimmte Kausalität….” (KdpV, B 83–84).
As is the case with other would-be deductions of [self]-constituting metaphysical
universality, this one may be (re)formulated as a (literally) self-referential paradox:
(cf. 3.44–3.45 above), that
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29 Each ‘reasonable being’ ‘must’ be able to will that
[each ‘reasonable being’ ‘must’ be able to will that
[[…]]].
The indefinite ‘implosion’ of “[[…]]”’s suggests a fault-line in Kant’s attempts
to assimilate a practical Verstandeswelt (mundus intelligibilis, or conceptual world;
cf., e.g., Gr, 458 and KdpV, 74) to the Noumena of his theoretical or speculative
philosophy.
For the characteristic of the latter in the Dialectic is their conceptual underdeter-
mination and openness to plurality of interpretation, at least “in spekulativer Absicht”
(“in speculative intent”). (Compare the Antinomies, and Kant’s incisive analyses of
traditional ‘proofs’ of the existence of god).
But this underdetermination and hermeneutic plurality contrasts sharply with the
‘regulative’ ‘necessity’ and unicity Kant postulated for his ‘realm of ends’—in (Gr,
445), for example, when he wrote that
30 Wer also Sittlichkeit für Etwas und nicht für eine chimärische Idee ohne Wahrheit
hält, muß das angeführte Prinzip derselben zugleich einräumen.
Who(soever) considers morality to be something, and not a chimerical idea without
truth, must concede the principles we have advanced.
As a would-be “reasonable being”, I would certainly “consider morality to be
something”. But I would also consider the dichotomy Kant imposes in this passage
a groundless petitio of the doctrine I called ‘semantic monism’: denial, in the case at
hand, that
31 there could be any alternative to ‘existence’ of ‘ultimate’ ‘speculative’, ‘practical’
and ‘teleological’ interpretations and other “truths”), except utter inconsistency
(”eine chimärische Idee”).
Such begged dichotomies and ‘first-cause’-analogies underlie the ambiguities that
arise from Kant’s “ascription problem”, mentioned earlier, and in particular the notori-
ously uneven success of Kant’s “examples” at Gr, pp. 422–424 and 429–430 mentioned
earlier.
But they also suggest why there is something deeply, genuinely and recurrently cor-
rect as well as ‘problematic’ in Kant’s ‘transcendental’ acknowledgment, at (p. 419),
that
32 es durch kein Beispiel, mithin empirisch auszumachen sei, ob es überall
irgend einen dergleichen Imperativ gebe.…
it is not to be made out through any sort of example, and thus empirically, whether
there is anywhere any imperative of the kind.
Since every moral dilemma we are likely to face comes trailing clouds of back-
ground conditions and boundary-assumptions, it seems to me eminently ‘reasonable’
(in Kant’s own sense) to
33 abandon Kant’s semantic monism, in the passage from Gr, 445 quoted above, and
interpret its implicit ‘if-then’ assertion (”Whoever considers…must concede.…”),
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as the hypothetical (rather than categorical) meta-imperative it seems in fact to
be.
Once one does this, however, it also seems ‘reasonable’ to grant him that
34 reflective—and ultimately reflexive and [self]-determining—contemplative activity
and respect for such activity in all other “reasonable Beings” are the recurrent—but
‘liminal’ and essentially incomplete ‘grounds’ of moral action,
in keeping with
35 Aristotle’s observations of children’s desires (orexeis) to ‘know’ and praises of
theoria (or energeia theoretike) as the ‘highest’ forms of thought, namely “thought
about thought”, and
36 Kant’s injunction to ‘displace ourselves’ (”sich hineinversetzen”) into “intelligi-
ble” realms of ends (in his sense of “intelligible”),
conceived as an
37 empathetic imperative to ‘displace ourselves’, however inadequately, into the suf-
ferings and aspirations of other “reasonable beings” (Gustave Gilbert may have
been right about the origins of “evil”).
I have already argued (in 27 and 28 above)
38 that respect for sentience, in all its gradations—construed as inchoate energeiai
theoretikai—is the mark of Kant’s elusive ‘good will’, in all its gradations, and
39 that provisional respect (Kant’s Achtung) for the emergence and possible presence
of such theoria in others is an inherent constituent of that regulative ground, and
basis for a more modest and heuristic categorical imperative.
This is the essence, for me, of Kant’s alternative formulation of the imperative, as
respect for the generative capacities of ‘[self]-legislating’ theoria in other ‘reasonable
beings’, to be treated as ends (not only in [themselves], but to [themselves]), rather
than (mere) ‘means’.
What we should enjoin ourselves to “respect”, in other words—in a form of col-
lective ‘self-legislation’—are ‘innocent’ (non-‘harming’) forms of Aristotle’s desire.
This respect, in a sense, might also be an appropriate dialectical/skeptical
elenchos—“in praktischer Absicht”—of Descartes’ rhetorical paranoid worries in
Meditation II about the “hats and clothes under which might lie automata” (“pileos et
vestes sub quibus latere possent automata”, AT VII 32).
Who knows? But more to the point, I believe: what do ‘we’ know about [ourselves],
that entitles us to judge that other potential ‘reasonable beings’—Kant’s phrase—are
not up to ‘our’ standards?
Kant’s explicitly latitudinarian view of the distribution of possible ‘reasonableness’
(cf. Gr, 408 and 426) got this right, I think. And John Searle, in his “Chinese Room”
parable—a fallacious ‘EA-argument’ which exactly reverses Descartes’ ‘worry’ about
the hats and clothes on springs—got it thoroughly and dogmatically wrong.
I believe, at any rate, that some of these insights may have inspired the “awe”
(Ehrfurcht) Kant struggled to express, in his famous vision of the vault above him and
moral law within him.
For it is this processive “awe” itself that moves us: that we cherish in our children;
that we want to foster and protect in each other, and in ourselves. The vault and the
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‘law’ are only placeholders for it, provisional emblems for an elusive and forever
underdetermined Erhabenheit (sublimity) in Kant’s ‘theoretical’ vision—and ours.
6 Reflective inquiry and “Systeme von Zwecken”
At KdrV, B 672, Kant characterised a “System” as “eine gewisse kollektive Einheit
zum Ziele der Verstandeshandlungen”, and he sketched suggestively ‘metatheoretical’
and ‘hierarchical’ roles for such “Systeme” in KdrV, B 692, quoted above.
‘Experience’, on the account I have offered, ‘is’ (or may pragmatically be viewed as)
a indefinitely ramified ‘System’ of such ‘Systeme’, which ‘individuate’ and ‘objectify’
in graduated ways as they ‘ascend’.
‘Stages’ in such metatheoretic hierarchies, moreover, have an interesting sort of
‘distributive’ or ‘kollektive Einheit’, for
1 all Stone spaces (topological spaces of semantic interpretations of essentially
incomplete first-order theories) are topologically and measure-theoretically ‘iso-
morphic’ (cf. 1.3 and 7.29–7.30 below).
What distinguishes particular theories from other particular theories in this hierar-
chical myriad are their (metatheoretically ‘intended’) formal vocabularies, of course;
but also, and more deeply,
2 their patterns of syntactical and semantic interpretation, which order and inter-
relate them; and
3 their (recursion-theoretic) complexities, which effectively determine the ‘isomor-
phisms’.
In this section, I will argue
4 that Kant tacitly acknowledged in the third Critique that he had offered an artificially
isolated and experimentally ‘controlled’ structure of ‘experience’, which could not
(for example) even determine its allegedly fixed (Newtonian) boundary-conditions.
(It was known, for example, in the late eighteenth century that Newton’s analyses—
which construed the planets as point-masses—could not cope with their mutual
interactions, much less account for observed perturbations in their actual orbits.);
5 that Kant saw that some sort of metatheoretic ascent or Regressus might present itself
if the ‘observational’ base of his “Anschauungen” turned out not to ‘determine’ more
‘heuristic’ and nuanced aspects of scientific inquiry (the indefinite ‘complexities’
of ‘the organic’, for example);
and finally,
6 that he saw that underdetermination of that ‘intuitive’ observational base might also
be reflected in iterations of KdrV, B 692’s conceptual register-shifts; and that such
iterations might ‘open’ the first Critique’s rigid two-stage architectonic, and blur
or relativise its allegedly sharp ‘transcendental’ demarcation of “Verstand” from
“Vernunft”.
One aspect of this recognition might be the oddly enhanced role given in the third
Critique to “reflectierende Urteilskraft” (“reflective judgment”), characterised as a
form of mediation (“Mittelglied”, KdU, iv) between ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’.
123
4288 Synthese (2014) 191:4253–4314
In the first and third Critiques, this Vermögen assumed the interestingly ‘metathe-
oretic’ role of “Überlegung” (“reflection” or “deliberation”; literally, “overlaying”):
a
“Bewußtsein des Verhältnisses gegebener Vorstellungen zu unseren verschiede-
nen Erkenntnisquellen” (“awareness of the relation of given representations to
our various sources of knowledge”, KdrV, B 316); and
“Unterscheidung der Erkenntniskraft, wozu die gegebenen Begriffe gehören”
(KdrV, B 317) (“discrimination of the capacity for knowledge to which the
various concepts belong”), [welche] “auf die Gegenstände selbst geht” (“[which]
applies to the objects themselves”, KdrV, B 319).
In this ‘capacity’, “reflective Urteilskraft” effectively
7 assigned orders or levels to (what might be called) ‘object’- as well as ‘concept-
formation’ ([welche] “auf die Gegenstände …geht”);
and in so doing, it
8 ambiguated (and transcended’) the otherwise rigorously closed architectonic of
‘reason’ in the first and second Critiques, in which “Reflexion” appeared only in the
guise of an “Amphibolie” (cf. KdrV, B 316–349).
In metalogical analyses, counterparts of such (potentially higher-intentional) acts of
‘discernment’—‘the’ local distinction between theory and metatheory, for example—
function as type-or register-raisers which ride the wavefronts of metatheoretical hier-
archies, and locally ‘transcend’ what they ‘discern’.
It is plausible, therefore, that such a metaphysically ‘skeptical’ (or at least inquisi-
tive) Vermögen might have given Kant the conceptual instrument he needed to absorb
and buffer the ‘awareness’ I attributed to him in 4–6 above.
Similar preoccupations might also have led him to
9 give greater prominence to the incomplete, underdetermined and (in my analogy)
type-straddling notion of a “System” which ‘merely’ regulated emerging bound-
aries of ‘experiences’ (cf., once again, KdrV, B 672 and KdrV, B 692); and
10 postulate evolving (and perhaps ramifying) forms of “Reflexion” about ‘nat-
ural’ and ‘organic’ Systeme of “Zwecke” and “Zweckmäßigkeit”, which would
(re)inform and (re)interpret extensions of the Analytic’s scientifically as well as
‘teleologically’ inadequate Anschauungen and Begriffe.
And this, in turn, might have led Kant—or someone troubled by the equivocal ways
in which he used words like “Vollständigkeit” in the Analytic and Dialectic—to
11 consider more latitudinarian (and more ‘counterfactual’-supporting) notions of
‘causality’,
12 acknowledge at least tacitly that the ‘closure’ of the Aesthetic and Analytic doesn’t
‘work’, and
13 explore ‘merely regulative ‘principles’ and forms of ‘causality’ in ‘heuristi-
cally’ adequate notions of Zweckmäßigkeit (glossed at KdU, B344 as “die Geset-
zmäßigkeit des Zufälligen” (“the lawlikeness of the contingent”; cf. 18 and 19
below) ohne (a final, uniform) ‘Zweck’ (purpose).
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Kant’s characterisation of “Zweckmäßigkeit” as a ‘merely regulative’ “Geset-
zmäßigkeit des Zufälligen”, just cited, also raises methodological questions about the
absence of ‘counterfactual support’ for ‘lawlike’ assertions in the KdrV):
14 do claims that ‘real’ lawlikeness (Gesetzmäßigkeit) only holds for systems which
are ‘necessary’ in the sense that they are deterministic not beg the question of the
Analytic’s ‘underlying’ (‘Laplacian’) determinism?
And if they do,
15 what are we to make of (ostensibly) ‘metaphysical’ (as opposed to ‘merely’ mathe-
matical) assertions that ‘real’ ‘experiential’ causation—construed as a ‘physical’
form of alethic modal entailment—‘supports counterfactuals’, if there are no
counterfactuals to support?
The problems raised by these queries are oddly cognate to Hume’s failure to dis-
tinguish between ‘factual’ (indicative) and ‘counterfactual-supporting’ (subjunctive)
implications in his ‘definitions’ of “Cause” in the first Enquiry (Hume 1975, §60, 76).
But they are hardly confined to the metaphysics of Hume and Kant.
For they persist in cognate problems for any ‘causal’ metaphysics in which we do
not (and, I believe, cannot) know how to ‘choose’ ‘ultimate’ metatheoretic ‘boundary-
conditions’ for ‘virtual’ modal semantics of ‘worlds’ and ‘accessibility’-relations
which interpret their ‘causes’.
Prompted by (what I have read as) Kant’s tacit acknowledgment that ‘mediation’
by ‘reflective judgment’ might iterate ‘the’ Anschauung/Begriff/Idee-hierarchy, I have
therefore sought to
16 relativise that hierarchy;
17 ‘open’ its rigid three-level Architektonik;
18 iterate such relativisations in ramified patterns of metatheoretical ascent; and
finally
19 appeal to such patterns to formulate ‘conceptual’ interpretations of (‘theoretical’,
‘practical’ and ‘reflective’) ‘experience’ within shifting horizons of metatheoretic
complexity.
Metalogical studies of such hierarchies suggest that essentially incomplete and
underdetermined Systeme and their hierarchies may ‘regulate’ emerging boundaries
of experiences, and that notions of Zweckmäßigkeit may ‘inform’ and (re)interpret
such regulative systems and their notions of ‘causality’.
Within various stages of such ‘systems’, for example, one can ‘rationally’ as well
as ‘reasonably’ assimilate Endzwecke or causae finales to provisional forms of meta-
logical explanation or interpretation, but accept that no ‘ultimate’ ‘finality’ for them
will ever come into view.
Such ‘principles’ and forms of ‘causality’, moreover, would be (‘merely)
“heuristic”, “reflective”, “regulative” and “problematic”. In analogy with certain
aspects of Kant’s usage, they would be
20 “heuristisch”, in that they (‘merely’) serve “‘den’ “besonderen Gesetzen der Natur
nachzuforschen …. ohne über ‘die’ Natur hinaus ‘den’ Grund ‘der’ Möglichkeit
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derselben zu suchen” (“inquire into ‘the’ particular laws of nature …without
searching beyond nature [to inquire] about its ground”, KdU, B355).
(The single quotation marks in the quotation are obviously mine: we tend to forget
that the original senses of “physis” and “natura” were processive as well as ‘organic’.)
They would be
21 “reflektiv” in that they seek to discern theories’ orders of complexity and relative
interpretability, but do not define or determine ‘ultimately’ ‘canonical’ interpre-
tations for them.
(Kant’s (1974) “reflective Urteilskraft” sought ‘only’ to ‘subsume’ its intentional
objects, whereas the ‘Vermögen’ he called “understanding” ‘determined’ them; cf.,
e.g., KdU, B 311–313 and B 365).
They would be (‘merely’)
22 “regulative” in that they are “nur …Regel[n], welche …einen Regressus gebiete[n],
dem es niemals erlaubt ist, bei einem Schlechthinunbedingten stehen zu bleiben”
(“only rule[s] which prescribe a regress in which one is never permitted to halt at
an utterly unconditioned [limit]”; KdrV, B 536–537).
(Notice that Kant retained in this context Hume’s distinction between “Geset-
zlichkeit” and what Wittgenstein later called “Regelbefolgung”…)
And such ‘principles’, ‘concepts’ and ‘judgments’ would finally be
23 “problematic” in that
(a) “man das Bejahen oder Verneinen [derer] als bloß möglich (beliebig)
annimmt” (“one takes the affirmation or denial [of them] as possible
(optional)”, KdrV, B100);
and
(b) they are “…Begrenzung[en] gegebener Begriffe” [welche] “mit anderen Erken-
ntnissen zusammenhäng[en], dessen objektive Realität …auf keine Weise
erkannt werden kann” (“boundaries of given concepts” [which] “fit together
with other forms of knowledge whose objective reality cannot in any way be
known”, KdrV, B 310).
(Cf. also the remark that
23(c) “[i]ns Innere der Natur dringt Beobachtung und Zergliederung der Erschein-
ungen, und man kann nicht wissen, wie weit dieses mit der Zeit gehen werde”
(“observation and distinction of appearances penetrate into the interior of
nature, and one cannot know how far this might go [on] over time”, KdU,
B334)).
Some definitions and characterisations may clarify other aspects of the relativisa-
tions I have sketched. In the context of 16–19 above, for example,
24 a “system” may be any finitely (or finitarily) ‘overviewable’ substructure of an
eventually first-order metatheoretic hierarchy;
25 an act or instance of “reflection” (or “reflective judgment”) ‘locally’ identifies a
given system’s relative ‘position’ in such a metatheoretic hierarchy (as above; cf.
once again KdrV, B316ff);
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26 an “end” or “purpose” (“Zweck”) (cf. 5.20) is once again a (syntactically or seman-
tically) interpreted object-theoretic assertion (the German ‘Sachverhalt’) at some
stage in such a hierarchy;
27 a (regulative) “law” (or ‘merely’ ‘zweckmäßige’ “Maxime”) is a modal impli-
cation which asserts that certain ‘means’ or hypothetically contributory ‘causes’
jointly ‘entail’ certain ‘ends’ in a metatheoretic environment in which we do not
and cannot know what ranges of ‘counterfactual’ alternatives the implication might
‘support’.
At a number of points in the third Critique, Kant argued for the claim that cognitive
agents have a right to ‘impute’ (“ansinnen”) certain attributes or judgments to others,
and such “imputation” is not confined to aesthetic judgments.
The more common noun-usage “Ansinnen” has many senses in Kant’s and other
German-speakers’ usage (“demand”, “request” “expectation” “imposition” and “point
of view” among them), and
28 an assertion that a given ‘reflective judgment’ of mine is “ansinnbar” (an adjectival
form Kant does not use) might therefore be construed as
29 a ‘liminal’ assertion that whatever ‘interprets’ ‘my experience’ (in ways which
may not be fully knowable to ‘me’, or even expressible in ‘my’ language) ‘should’
interpret ‘my’ ‘reflective judgment’ or expression of that ‘experience’ accordingly.
Such ‘interpretability’—which might be construed, as Kant suggests, as a form of
communicability—would assure a form of relative consistency:
30 if ‘the world’ ‘makes sense’, so do ‘I ’, or at least ‘my’ expression or reflection of
a given aesthetic or ‘practical’ aspect of it. (Or so ‘I ’ think).
Methodologically, at least, this metalogical reading of the ‘subjektive Algeme-
ingültigkeit’ of Kantian aesthetic judgments seems to me defensible.
More relevantly, it may clarify the conceptual asymmetry between aesthetic
“Ansinnbarkeit” and moral “solidarity”. For the former demands that others ‘appre-
ciate’ what I ‘appreciate’, and the other that I try to ‘comprehend’ the capacity to
‘appreciate’ in others. The former may or may not be a ‘just’ demand, but it is literally
‘egocentric’ and ‘self-absorbed’ in ways the latter is not.
Be that as it may, the principal burden of this section has been to make two closely
related points:
31 that what is genuinely ‘regulative’ of ‘inquiry’ are attempts to consider, critique
and appreciate “Zwecke” (“purposes”); and
32 that zetetic inquiry is not only regulative of ‘experience’. It is also a form of
generative skepsis, and a form—and perhaps prototype—of “Zweckmäßigkeit
ohne Zweck”.
Distributively, one might also characterise such ‘experiential’ systems and their
‘dynamics’ as graduated forms of “Erfahrungsmäßigkeit ohne (schlechthinnige)
Erfahrung”, and construe them as heuristic ‘regulative ideals’ of such ‘experience’
(or ‘expérience(s)’).
Since uniform quasi-Kantian ‘preconditions’ of such ‘experience’ would not, in
particular, be object-theoretically definable at any stage of theoretical inquiry, the
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underdetermination of such ‘systems” boundary-conditions and ‘counterfactual’ envi-
ronments might also be
33 compared with the ‘confusion’ Leibniz attributed to attempts to understand
‘notiones concretae’, and
34 interpreted as a margin of the infinite (or at least indefinite) in the finite, or at least
the conceptually finitary.
‘Origins’, ‘preconditions’ and semantically ‘intended’ interpretations are object-
theoretically invisible in all the gradations of metatheoretical hierarchies they ‘condi-
tion’ and ‘regulate’.
We cannot, for example, define or measure ‘all’ ‘conceivable…’/‘conceptual…’
definition or measurement. For the only way to remove the “‘…”’s is to relativise
one’s inquiry to particular expressible theories in which one can begin to make sense
of ‘conception’, ‘definition’ and ‘measurement’. (Notice the parallels between these
notions and mathematical ‘boundary-conditions’ and physical ‘experimental prepara-
tion’.)
If the ‘cogito’-like responses Descartes, Berkeley and Kant offered to Sect. 3’s
criterial hierarchies ‘worked’, in the presuppositionless ways their authors apparently
intended, it would be to witness the incoherence of the (meta)theory in which they are
formulated.
For ‘last’ clauses in the stoic/skeptical dialogue which gave rise to ‘cogito’-like
arguments will always reinstate skeptical doubt of skeptical doubt, in order to reinstate
minimal stoic consistency-demands.
Fixed-point arguments, for example, would have little ‘constitutive’ force for ‘the’
unicity of ‘experience’, but quite a bit of ‘regulative’ value as ‘local’ guidance for
avoidance of certain conspicuous forms of ‘transcendental illusion’.
If one could, for example, ‘define’ ‘transcendence’ in one of Sect. 2’s ‘intelligible’
theories, one could also formulate a ‘diagonal’ assertion which would be equivalent
to [its own] ‘transcendence’.
But this would undermine the ‘definition’: for no syntactical interpretation of such
a sentence would accurately ‘define’ (‘the’ ‘preconditions’ of) [its own] ‘immanence’.
If Einstein had been ‘right’, therefore, that
35 ‘the’ world is ‘complete’ (a word he often used in his debates with Niels Bohr) and
epistemically accessible (since ‘der Alte’, like Descartes’ ‘god’, does not ‘deceive’
us),
he would also (on good Gödelian grounds) be ‘wrong’,
36 for ‘it’ would either be as incomplete as ‘we’ are, or as epistemically inaccessible
to ‘itself’ as ‘it’ is to ‘us’.
One the evidence of such arguments, it might be a ‘transcendental illusion’ that
‘experience’ has a ‘constitutive’ “Grenzbestimmung”, and ‘reasonable beings’ would
be more ‘reasonable’ to the extent they understand this.
This predicament might be regulative of Kant’s ‘Schicksal der Vernunft’ as well as
‘expérience’and ‘compréhension’, in both French senses of these words. But it might
also be one of reason’s cradle-gifts: a source of
37 skeptical self-awareness that ‘ultimate’ self-knowledge is little more than a seman-
tic paradox; and of
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38 ‘creativity’ in that no such ‘ultimate’ Übersicht bounds ‘reasonable beings” con-
ceptual event-horizons.
To see that this might be so, consider two recurrent arguments of the sort canvassed
earlier:
39 a ‘neo-Kantian’ one that some stage of metatheoretic ascent is closable as ‘expe-
rience’; and
40 a ‘Peircean’ one that ‘the’ entire ascent is linear and unique, and this ‘course of
inquiry’ is ‘experience’.
In this context, all I have done is propose a nonlinear alternative to Peircean
‘limit(s)’, in which convergence is plural and there is no ‘ultimate’ hierarchy-internal
‘overview’.
That ‘intelligible’ theories cannot ‘intend’ their own interpretation and that hierar-
chies of them are indefinitely iterable is a metalogical theorem.
That ramification of such hierarchies is limitless is a regulative ideal of experiential
openness as well as contemplative “Erhabenheit” (“sublimity”), in ways I will try to
explore in the next section.
That ‘we’ can ‘go on’ in such hierarchies is an article of ‘reasonable faith’, sustained
by ‘liminal’ postulations of consistency and ‘intentional’ interpretation which hover
indefinitely at the margins of what they define.
7 Reflective inquiry and Kant’s two “Unermeßlichkeiten”
At the end of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kant (1974) wrote the following
resonant sentence, later inscribed on his cenotaph in Königsberg:
Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewun-
derung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit
beschäftigt: der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir.
(KdpV, p. 288)
Two things fill the sensibility with ever new and growing awe, the more often
and more persistently reflection occupies itself with them: the starred firmament
above me, and the moral law within me.
To me at least, these lines suggest that for all his ‘critical’ acceptance of Newtonian
“Mechanism”, Kant saw something comparably “erhaben” (“sublime”) in ‘regulative
ideals’ of the macrocosmos ‘above’ us and microcosmos ‘within’ us.
Prompted by this interpretation, I will appeal in this section to ‘liminal’ as well as
limitless aspects of the foregoing sections’ interpretation of ‘experience’ to
1 argue for an evenhandedly ‘regulative’ interpretation of both these ideals” and
2 compare Kant’s two “Unermeßlichkeiten” (“immeasurabilities”; cf. 7 below) with
metalogical and metaphysical counterparts of Pascal’s two infinités or abîmes”.
Recall (or observe) first that Kant considered “Achtung” (“respect”) and “Ehrfurcht”
(“awe”) intentional attitudes appropriate to (inadequate) attempts to contemplate two
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closely interrelated limiting ideals: “Pflicht” (“duty”), and “das Erhabene” (“the sub-
lime”).
“Achtung”, for example, in the third Critique was the
3 “sense of the inadequacy of our capacity to attainment of an idea which obligates
us” (“Gefühl der Unangemessenheit unseres Vermögens zur Erreichung einer Idee,
die für uns Gesetz ist”) (KdU, B 96).
When that “respect” is engendered by contemplation of
4 “the intellectual, in itself purposeful [and] (morally) good” (“das intellektuelle, an
sich selbst zweckmäßige (das Moralisch-)Gute”, cf. KDU, B 120), then regard for
this ideal is also “erhaben” (“sublime”).
For it is
5 “not pleasure, but self-estimation (of the humanity in us), which raises us above
our need [for pleasure]” (“kein Vergnügen ist, sondern eine Selbstschätzung (der
Menschheit in uns), die uns über das Bedürfnis desselben erhebt”) (KdU, B 228),
and its view or contemplation
6 “gives us just access to …the idea of a great system of natural ends” (“[uns] zu der
Idee eines großen Systems der Zwecke der Natur …berechtigt”),
which we
7 “love as well as contemplate for its immeasurability, and find ourselves ennobled
in that contemplation.” (“lieben, sowie ihrer Unermeßlichkeit wegen mit Achtung
betrachten und uns selbst in dieser Betrachtung veredelt fühlen….”) (KdU, B303,
emphasis mine).
Such “Liebe”, finally, engenders a ‘higher’ and more ‘autonomous’ form of ‘human-
ist’ respect, namely
8 “Ehrfurcht”, or “respect for a ruler …which lies within us, [and therefore] awakens
a sense of the sublime in our own [self -]determination which inspires us more than
anything beautiful” (“Achtung …gegen seinen Gebieter, [der] …in uns selbst liegt,
[und daher] ein Gefühl des Erhabenen unserer eigenen Bestimmung erweckt,
was uns mehr hinreißt als alles Schöne”) (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der
bloßen Vernunft, VI, 23–24fn).
In what follows, I will assimilate
9 Kant’s first “Unermeßlichkeit” (“der bestirnte Himmel über mir”) to the immea-
surably ramifying metatheoretic “Systeme” of ‘intelligible’ theories evoked above
in Sects. 2 through 4,
and
10 his second “Unermeßlichkeit” (“das moralische Gesetz in mir”) to the cor-
relatively immeasurable and ramifying ‘hypotheoretic’ “Systeme” of variably
encoded forms of awareness or consciousness which may be expressed ‘within’
them,
respect for which I offered earlier as less prescriptive but (in my view at least) no less
“erhabene” Alternativen to the various forms of Kant’s categorical imperative.
These assimilations will carry with them cognate metalogical interpretations of two
other “Ideen” in Kant’s writings:
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11 ‘physical’ “Organism” (or “Organisation”), invoked in several contexts in the
third Critique; and
12 ‘liminal’ ‘systematic’ “Horizonte”, mentioned twice in the first Critique, and at
considerably greater length in Kant’s lectures on “Logik”.
“Physik” (or “das Physische”), was emphatically not what we would call “(New-
tonian) physics”, but
13 ein Doctrinal System empirischer Erken[n]tnis (nicht ein empirisches System denn
der Begriff von einem solchen enthält einen Wiederspruch),
a doctrinal system of empirical knowledge (not an empirical system, for the concept
of such a thing contains a contradiction).
As the parenthetical remark suggests, such a ‘higher-order’ System might require
‘critical’ discernment of ‘empirical’ theory from ‘transcendental’ metatheory to avert
(semantic) paradox (“einen Wiederspruch”), and have
14 zweyerley Objecte: (1) was überhaupt Gegenstand der Erfahrung ist (2) dessen
Möglichkeit selbst nicht anders als durch Erfahrung erkennbar ist, wovon also die
Wirklichkeit vor der Möglichkeit nothwendig vorhergeht die also nicht a priori
erkannt werden kann (KW 2003, XXII, pp. 398–99).
two sorts of objects: (1) whatever is an object of experience (2) [something] whose
very possibility is not knowable other than through experience, the reality of
which necessarily precedes therefore its possibility[, and] therefore which can-
not be known a priori.
Quasi-Leibnizian ‘notiones completae’, for example, might ‘regulate’ Newtonian
‘Mechanism”s reference-frames and boundary conditions, as well as instances of what
Kant called “Organism”, or “das Organische” (terms which do not appear in the third
Critique, where he replaced them with more ‘dynamic’ and ‘processive’ usages such
“organisieren” and “Organisation”).
In his deconstruction of Swedenborgian mysticism, for example (Traüme eines
Geistersehers, KW, XVIII, p. 13), Kant observed in passing that “das physische ist nicht
pneumatisch, sondern organisch”, and he remarked in other non-‘critical’ texts that
15 [d]ie dynamische Erklarungsart ist entweder mechanisch durch Werkzeuge die
selbst bewegender Kräfte zu ihrer Existenz bedürfen und wenn sie ihrer Natur
nach Zwecke ihrer Bildung voraussetzen [o]rganisch vorgestellt werden. (KW,
XXI, p. 233)
the dynamic mode of explanation is either mechanical, by means of instruments
which themselves require moving forces for their existence, [or] if they are rep-
resented organically in accordance with their nature [and] presuppose [aims or]
ends for their formation.
and formulated a
16 …Definition eines organischen Körpers …daß er ein Körper ist dessen jeder Theil
um des anderen willen (wechselseitig als Zweck und zugleich als Mittel) da ist.—
Man sieht leicht daß dies eine bloße Idee ist der a priori die Realität (d.i. daß es
ein solches Ding geben könne) nicht gesichert ist.
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Man kann die Erklärung dieser Fiction auch anders stellen: Er ist ein Körper
an welchem die innere Form des Ganzen vor dem Begriffe der Composition aller
seiner Theile …in Ansehung ihrer gesammten bewegenden Kräfte vorhergeht (also
Zweck und Mittel zugleich ist). (KW, XXI, p. 210)
…definition of an organic body …that it is a body whose every part is there for the
sake of [every] other (reciprocally as end and means).—One sees readily that this
is a mere idea, whose reality (that is that such a thing could exist) is not a priori
ensured. One can also put the explanation of this fiction differently: it is a body for
which the inner form of the whole precedes the concept of the composition of all
of its parts …in view of their collective moving forces ([and] therefore is at once
end and means).
(It may be worth observation that more precise analogues of Kant’s struggle to
‘define’ ‘the organic’ may be found in mathematical-physical notions of an “interact-
ing field”).
Freed, in short, from the narrow confines of his ‘transcendental’ rationales for New-
ton’s differential equations, Kant acknowledged that his “Physik”’s ‘merely regulative’
entailments might lead into ‘rational’ but indefinitely complex realms of Fiction(en)
and bloße Ideen (cf. Newton’s notorious remark that “hypotheses non fingo”).
One might, for example, ‘transcend’ (KW, XXI, p. 233) deterministic ‘heteronomy’
with appeals to prototypes of ‘complexity’, ‘emergence’ and ‘self-organisation’, if such
“bloße Ideen” were made (meta)mathematically precise in reasonably predictive ways.
‘Skeptical’ arguments, I believe, suggest that they can, and my modification of
Galileo’s famous dictum to suggest in 0.1 above that ‘the book of philosophy’ might
(and perhaps should) be written in the language(s) of metamathematics was partly
animated by this conviction.
It was also guided by a belief that if such programmatic conjectures turn out to have
regulative value, the fate of Carnap’s Aufbau suggests that
17 they will have to be adaptive and provisional rather than prescriptive, and that
18 those who make them would be well advised to acknowledge their essential incom-
pleteness and recurrently ‘liminal’ metamathematical margins.
For it is quite conceivable that
19 interrelations between ‘the’ ‘book of philosophy’ and ‘language of
(meta)mathematics’ might themselves form ‘systems’ of ‘intelligible’ theories
whose metametamathematical properties evolve and ramify in ways we cannot
anticipate, much less dictate.
Still—as the Danish saying goes, “blind chickens find also a grain” (“blinde
høns finder også et korn”), and an allegedly ‘heuristic’ proposal should try to ‘find’
(“heurein”) something from time to time.
Here is a possible “korn”. In one of 4.10’s hierarchically organised “systems”,
answers to queries about object-theoretic consequences might serve as ‘means’ to
more complex metatheoretic ‘ends’, and conversely.
Finitary ‘intelligible systems’ and their insights might therefore ‘evolve’ in such
hierarchies—in which higher-order metatheoretic ‘ends’ in one ‘systematic’ context
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became object-theoretic ‘means’ in another—and stages of such evolution might be
construed as
20 [d]as Materiale[,] in so fern es nur problematisch gedacht und eine Tendenz
enthält es sich assertorisch als gegeben vorzustellen (Organisch, Unorganisch).
(KW, XXII, p. 480)
[t]he material[,] in so far as it is only thought problematically and possesses a
tendency to represent itself as given assertorily (Organic, Inorganic).
All of this, once again, would remain ‘merely regulative’, ‘physically’ underdeter-
mined and metamathematically incomplete …ad indefinitum. But such underdetermi-
nation might at least be informative, as well as compatible with several of Kant’s more
‘skeptical’ (or at least ‘merely regulative’) remarks—that
21 [d]ie Mathematik wird durch Philos. indirect begründet …(KW, XXII, p. 78),
[m]athematics is indirectly grounded through philos[ophy],
for example; or that
22 ([d]er Begriff von organisi[e]rten Körpern gehört zum Fortschreiten im System
der Wa[h]rnehmungen des Subjects das sich selbst affici[e]rt) (KW, XXII, p. 398);
[t]he concept of organised bodies belongs to what is processive in the system of
perceptions of the subject which [ap]perceives itself;
or that
23 [m]an fängt da nicht von Objecten an sondern von dem System der Möglichkeit
sein eigenes denkendes Subject zu constitui[e]ren und ist selbst Urheber seiner
Denkkraft (KW, XXI, p. 79).
[o]ne does not begin from objects[,] but from the system of the possibility to con-
stitute one’s own thinking subject and [one] is the originator of one’s capacity for
thought;
or even that
24 die zweyte [organische Ordnung der Natur, d.i. die Form derselben nach Regeln]
ist auf einer Idee gegründet, die des einzelnen sich als Werkzeug zu einer Einrich-
tung bedient, die aus den einzelnen Naturdingen nach allgemeinen Gesetzen nicht
entsprungen wäre.) (KW, XVII, p. 418)
the second [organic order of nature, i.e. the form of it in accordance with rules]
is based on an idea, which makes use of the particular as [an] instrument for an
arrangement which would not [otherwise] have arisen from the separate things of
nature in accordance with general laws.
My appeals to metatheoretical underdetermination might also be compatible with
Kant’s rare but carefully formulated (if ‘merely regulative’) remarks about ‘Horizonte’
in the first Critique:
25 Der Inbegriff aller möglichen Gegenstände für unsere Erkenntnis scheint uns eine
ebene Fläche zu sein, die ihren scheinbaren Horizont hat, nämlich das, was den
ganzen Umfang derselben befaßt, und von uns der Vernunftbegriff der unbed-
ingten Totalität genannt worden. Empirisch denselben zu erreichen, ist unmöglich,
und nach einem gewissen Prinzip ihn a priori zu bestimmen, dazu sind alle Ver-
suche vergeblich gewesen. (KdrV, B787)
The aggregate of all possible objects for our knowledge seems to us to be a plane
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surface, which has its apparent [or specious] horizon, namely that which includes
the entire extent of that knowledge, and has been called by us the concept-of-reason
of unconditioned totality. To reach this [horizon] empirically is impossible, and
[as for efforts] to determine [or define] it in accordance with a particular principle
a priori, all [such] efforts have been in vain.
I have also argued that ‘der’ Vernunftbegriff ‘der’ unbedingten ‘Erfahrung’ is no
more unique or “a priori zu bestimmen” than ‘der’ Vernunftbegriff ‘der’ unbedingten
‘Totalität’—an assimilation which also seems to me compatible with Kant’s remark
(KdrV, B686–687, slightly abridged below) that
26 Man kann sich die systematische Einheit unter den drei logischen Principien auf
folgende Art sinnlich machen. Man kann einen jeden Begriff als einen Punkt
ansehen, der als der Standpunkt eines Zuschauers seinen Horizont hat, d.i. eine
Menge von Dingen, die aus demselben können vorgestellt und gleichsam über-
schauet werden. Innerhalb diesem Horizonte muß eine Menge von Punkten ins
Unendliche angegeben werden können, deren jeder wiederum seinen engeren
Gesichtskreis hat; …und der logische Horizont besteht nur aus kleineren Hor-
izonten …, nicht aber aus Punkten, die keinen Umfang haben (Individuen).
Aber zu verschiedenen Horizonten, d.i…. die aus eben so viel Begriffen bestimmt
werden, läßt sich ein gemeinschaftlicher Horizont, daraus man sie insgesamt als
aus einem Mittelpunkte überschauet, gezogen denken, …bis endlich …der all-
gemeine und wahre Horizont …aus dem Standpunkte des höchsten Begriff s
bestimmt wird und alle Mannigfaltigkeit als …unter sich befaßt.
One can make systematic unity [more] graphic [sensory] under the three logical
principles in the following way. One can see an arbitrary concept as a point which
as the standpoint of a viewer has its horizon, i.e., a set of things which can be
represented from it and surveyed, as it were. Within this horizon, one must be
able to posit a set of points in infinitum, each of which has its more limited field
of vision, …and the logical horizon consists only of smaller horizons, …not of
points, which have no extension (individuals). But to different horizons, …which
are determined from different [corresponding] concepts, a common horizon, from
which one can survey them all as [if] from a center, can be traced out in thought,
…until finally …the general and true horizon is determined …from the stand-
point of the highest concept, and the manifold comprehended …under it.
Many other interesting if problematic things could be said about Kant’s “Sinnlich-
machung” in the metalogical framework of this essay.
In the ellipses of this passage, for example, he interpreted “Horizonte” as
“Gattungen, Arten und Unterarten”…, whose most straightforward metalogical
counterparts would be
27 (consistent and recursively defined) “types” or imbricated collections of unary
predicates in the language of a given “intelligible” theory T.
One could, moreover, define
28 binary, ternary, n-ary and ‘nullary’ “types” as well, and identify the latter with
consistent, recursively axiomatisable theories which extend T.
For each such type, one could also define
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29 a ‘canonical’ boolean algebra (called its ‘Lindenbaum algebra’), as well as corre-
sponding (topological) ‘Stone spaces’—mentioned earlier in 1.3 and 6.1–6.3—in
which extensions of the given type determine closed subspaces.
‘Complete’ counterparts of such ‘types’, finally, could also be defined (as elements
of the aforementioned ‘Stone spaces’), but only in appropriate metatheories, and there
would be uncountably many of them.
The elements of such spaces—metalogical analogues of Kant’s “points, which have
no extension”—would be “durchgängig bestimmt”, in Kant’s language (“notiones
completae”, in Leibniz’), but ‘almost all’ of them would fail to be ‘intelligible’, in the
metalogical sense sketched earlier.
One might try to assimilate Kant’s “allgemeine(r) und wahre(r) Horizont” to an
entire ‘Stone space’ of such ‘points’, and such spaces are indeed ‘universal’ in various
topological and metatheoretic senses.
But they are also isomorphic to spaces of infinite sequences of ‘random’ coin
tosses, an observation which suggests that such ‘Venunftideen’ would degrade rather
than embody informational ‘truth’.
For it is also known that every “intelligible” theory has the same Stone space, whose
‘generality’ and ‘canonicity’ would therefore render its ‘reference-frame’ useless for
discrimination of one ‘intelligible’ theory from another.
To me at least, such observations call to mind two well-known predicaments in the
history of philosophy:
30 the immanent white noise of Spinoza’s (1967) transcendent deus sive natura; and
31 Kant’s remark that “concepts” without “intuitions” are “blind” (in the sense that
every intelligible theory may be said to furnish its own class of “intuitions”).
But it also suggests that a form of “Erhabenheit” may be found in
32 limitless ‘universes’ of ‘intelligible’ theories’ interpretations and capacities for
‘autological’ [self]-reference,
and that this ‘sublimity’ may be even more ‘disproportionate’ than Kant’s “bestirnter
Himmel” and the “two abysses” evoked in one of the most resonant passages of Pascal’s
(1963) Pensées:
33 Qui se considérera …[l]es deux abîmes de l’ infini et du néant, il tremblera dans
la vue de ses merveilles, et je crois que sa curiosité se changeant en admiration,
il sera plus disposé à les contempler en silence qu’à les rechercher avec présomp-
tion…. Quand on est instruit, on comprend que la nature ayant gravé son image
…dans toutes choses, elles tiennent presque toutes de sa double infinité: c’est
ainsi que nous voyons que toutes les sciences sont infinies en l’étendue de leurs
recherches…. Toutes choses sont sorties du néant et portées jusqu’a l’infini….
causées et causantes, aidées et aidantes, médiatement et immédiatement, ….
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Voilà notre état véritable. C’est ce qui nous rend incapables de savoir certainement
et d’ignorer absolument.
Anyone who considers …the two abysses of the infinite and the void, will tremble
in the sight of its marvels, and I believe that—curiosity changing into admiration—
will be more disposed to contemplate them in silence than explore them with
presumption….. When one is learned, one comprehends that since nature has
graven its image in …all things, almost all of them have something of this double
infinity: in this fashion we see that all forms of knowledge are infinite in the range[s]
of their inquiries…. All things have emerged from the void and are carried into
the infinite, …[and are] caused and causing, aided and aiding, mediately and
immediately, …. Therein is our veritable condition. This is what renders us unable
to know with certainty, and be ignorant absolutely.
In the essay’s final section, I will
34 argue that the ‘underdetermination’ of ramified ‘experiential’ hierarchies—a frag-
ile and inadequate form of ‘freedom’—has the dignity of one of its ‘preconditions’;
and
35 compare the “abîmes” of its endless ‘ramifications’ with the deltas and estuaries
of Norman MacLean’s “river”, in which faint traces might linger long after we
cease to ‘exist’.
8 Reflective inquiry as a form of skeptical “Theoria”
In an unpublished essay called “Skeptical Theoria as a Regulative Ideal”, I
1 compared phenomenal underdetermination to a ‘transcendental’ precondition of an
activity I called ‘skeptical theoria’ (a ‘via negativa’), and
2 assimilated such such theoria (or ‘via contemplativa’) to the “reine Selbsttätigkeit”
(“pure self-actuation”, Gr, 452) which Kant called Freiheit.
I also observed that
3 the ancient skeptics attached a regulative (or ‘contemplative’) value they found
significant to such epoche and the search for it.
That ‘regulative’ value, I also suggested (cf. 1.9 and 5.15 above), is Aristotle’s
‘desire’, not for ‘knowledge’, but for quasi-Kantian forms of ‘disinterested’ inquiry.
For ‘pyrrhonist’ and ‘academic’ skeptics alike believed (‘undogmatically’, of
course) that it conferred a kind of peace of mind they called “ataraxia” (roughly
“equanimity”, literally ‘non-perturbation’), a word one also finds in Stoic and Epi-
curean writings.
Also of interest, I believe, in the context of this essay’s metalogical analogies, is
the ‘problematic’ ‘reflexivity’ of such ‘ataractic’ self-attribution and ‘practical’ “self-
actuation”. For both introduce—as Kant observed—an implicit ‘critical’ (or ‘metathe-
oretical’) distinction between a ‘self’ and what calms or ‘actuates’ it.
In “Skeptical Theoria” (1997) as well as (Boos 1987), I also outlined a related
analogy between skeptical epoche about ‘phenomenally’ undecidable assertions, and
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(some of) the responses Immanuel Kant advocated to ‘transcendent’, ‘antinomial’
assertions of ‘pure reason’, which are, by definition, undecidable within ‘the’ Bereich
der Erscheinungen.
I drew inspiration for this, in part, from Kant’s own high valuation of the antinomies,
despite his disparaging remarks about skepticism in the “Transcendental Method-
ology” (cf. KdrV, B784–B797), but also from the evidence canvassed in foregoing
sections that
4 significant hermeneutic and alethic notions such as interpretability, definability,
and (a fortiori) ‘truth’ may indeed be Kantian ‘Grenzideen’, rather than Kantian
‘Begriffe’—in metalogic and in metaphysics;
or at least that
5 such hermeneutic and alethic notions are relational notions: conjectural and
schematic templates which our finite intellects are fortunate enough to be able
to project for heuristic investigation and dialectical and practical inquiry.
‘Disquotational’ ‘truth’ of a theory, for example—Tarski’s “Convention T”—is a
jejune second-order template. Nothing substantive emerges from it until we refine it
to the relational meatheoretic notion of ‘truth in a structure’.
Even then, moreover, ‘intelligible’ first-order theories will propose infinitely many
distinct candidates for such structures, which may be examined in infinitely many
branching candidates for appropriate metatheories.
‘Speculatively’ as well as ‘practically’, therefore, attempts to formulate [self]-
grounding ‘intelligible’ theories of the sort Descartes, Berkeley and Kant sought cannot
escape a kind of complementarity between the intentional finitude of our conceptual
horizons, and lack of closure of the concept-formation(s) we undertake within them.
For ‘intelligible’ theories face a choice between two ‘complementary’ alternatives:
undecidability and inexpressibility. This (literal) dilemma—a simple consequence, of
Gödel‘s insights into [internal] diagonalisation—may be posed as follows.
Such a theory—of ‘the self’, say; or ‘the world’; or Anselm’s formula ‘that than
which nothing greater can be conceived’ (Kant’s “psychologische, kosmologische und
theologische Ideen”)—must itself be incomplete. It can formulate, but never prove,
[its own] existence (consistency/interpretability).
By simple contraposition, then:
A complete limiting (meta)theory—not only of Kant’s three Ideen, but also of ‘the’
distinctions Kant tries to draw between speculative and practical, Phaenomena and
Noumena, Begriffe and Ideen, Vernunft and reflektierende Urteilskraft—would not
be ‘intelligible’ and could not, a fortiori, formulate or express (encode) [its own]
existence.
To put a mildly provocative point on it:
6 if a ‘canonical’ intelligible theory T of ‘experience’ (or ‘the god of the philosophers’;
or ‘der heilige Wille’; or ….) were provably ‘complete’ in some tacitly metatheoretic
faithful extension U of T (i.e., if the extension U decided every assertion in the
language of T), such a ‘proof’ would bear witness to the inconsistency of U as well
as T.
This recurrent complementarity—between intelligibility (or expressibility) and
putative (metatheoretic) universality—seems to me to take many forms in the his-
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tory of philosophy, as I’ve tried to suggest in Sect. 3’s examinations of the arguments
of Descartes, Berkeley and Kant.
More precisely, I have argued that we cannot ensure, or even canonically express,
certain ideals and Grenzideen, with anything like the constitutive Vollständigkeit and
semantic unicity that most classical metaphysicians (and most analytic philosophers)
have demanded of (and casually attributed to) ‘truth’.
I have also tried to suggest
7 that such semantic Vollständigkeit (completeness) is what is really at issue—as Kant
saw—in classical metaphysical examinations of the [self], and of ‘the god of the
philosophers’ and Kant’s three Ideen; and
More controversially, I have argued
8 that one can trace a number of analogies and between other metaphysicians’ ‘pro-
bative’ arguments made on behalf of these Ideen and Kant’s tacit appeals to ‘tran-
scendental’ design-arguments and the ‘archimedean’ leverage he attributed to his
‘critical’ distinctions and ‘transcendental deductions’; and
9 that the “durchgängige Bestimmung” Kant claimed to have ‘deduced’ for ‘the’
‘constitutive’ structure of ‘experience’ may be assimilated to the indeterminate
“Vollständigkeit der Bedingungen” he (cogently) characterised in the Dialectic as
a kind of underlying master-Vernunftidee.
In defense of the ‘locality’ of ‘critical’ theory/metatheory-distinctions, I have also
argued that we have no ‘ultimate’ decision-procedure which would enable us once and
for all to discern, in our ‘theoretical’ and metatheoretical inquiries, proof from [proof]
(existence from [existence]; consistency from [consistency]; ….).
Particular theories, for example—or at least their more feasible axiomatic
approximations—may be ‘locally’ immanent. But their ‘intended interpretations’—
even ‘the’ ‘intended’ interpretations of theories as ‘obvious’ as Peano arithmetic (an
axiomatisation of ‘the’ natural numbers)—are ‘locally’ but recurrently transzendent.
Such ‘intended interpretations’ are surely ‘abstractions’ in some sense, if anything
is. But such abstracta—which are not to be identified with the theories themselves, for
this quickly gives rise to semantic paradoxes—require even more ‘abstract’ metathe-
ories in which their ‘intentions’ can be grounded.
Even then, moreover, they are (I would suggest once again) either
10 theory-relative placeholders, which ride indefinite regresses of ascents of metathe-
oretic ‘forms’; or
11 ‘noumenal’ notions which are inexpressible in [themselves] (the echo of Kant’s
usage is once again deliberate).
On the processive account of ‘experience’ I have offered, the former are problematic
but recurrently ‘immanent’. The latter, by contrast, promote the notion of an ‘intended
interpretation’ to the level of its conceptual incompetence.
For nothing can (provably) ‘ground’ or ‘interpret’ what it cannot express—an obser-
vation which often seems to me to have eluded metaphysicians and philosophers of
language who engage in relationally unqualified talk about ‘truth’.
Correlatively, attempts to ‘ground’ (end) metatheoretic ascent in [self]
-interpretation—allegedly secured in the sort of ‘last’ metatheory considered in
Sects. 2 and 3—seem to me
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12 parade-examples of what Kant called “transzendent(al)er Schein” (cf. KdrV, B352
ff.), on a more or less equal basis with attempts to ground ‘the god of the philoso-
phers’ in [self]-causation, [self]-origination, [self]-organisation, or [self]-design.
Indeed, Kant’s attempts to ‘intend’ and secure a canonical extratheoretic interpreta-
tion of a collective (as well as subreptively uniform) [self], first, would seem to parallel
rather closely Descartes’ attempt to do this for a ‘psychological’ [self], along the lines
outlined above in Sects. 2 and 3.
More generally, ‘secular’ efforts to find last, ‘perfect’, self-realising metatheories
for such (putatively) ‘universal’ notions aspire to ‘complete’ [themselves], in ways
which recall ontological, ‘cosmological’, ‘physico-theological’ and other ‘regress’-
ending attempts to beg ‘theological’ notions of ultimate ‘design’.
Methodologically, for example,
13 claims that ‘all’ of mathematical physics (say)—or ‘all’ ‘real’ knowledge of a lan-
guage, for that matter—can be subsumed in some elusively ‘intended’ or ‘intuitive’
interpretation of ‘physics’—or what it ‘really’ ‘is’ to ‘speak a language’—
seem to me closely cognate to
14 Pascal’s baffling embrace of Jansenist dogma; Spinoza’s admirably stoic (but con-
ceptually ill-posed) assertions about ‘deus sive natura’; Leibniz’ more sympathetic
(but equally ill-posed) ‘principe de la raison suffisante’; and Kant’s transzenden-
tale Verstandeseinheit, whose ‘deduction’ he acknowledged would have to be a
Geschäft der Vernunft in KdrV, B692.
For such ‘global’ and ‘universal’ interpretations are all theory-marginal, in the
sense that they would have to be ‘intended’ and re-‘intended’ in ever-wider metathe-
ories. But the more ‘global’ one’s theoretical aspirations—and more ‘holist’ one’s
‘contemplation’ or theoria—the more open to metatheoretic ascent and emergent
reinterpretation(s) such aspirations and theoria will have to be.
Such tensions already appeared in Gaunilo’s shrewd suggestion that limiting cases
of the ‘conception’ and ‘perfection’ Anselm wanted us to ‘conceive’ and mentally
‘perfect’ might either be ‘trivial’, or at least imperfect (‘the most perfect island’) or
inconceivable.
They also recurred more strikingly in Hume’s (or “Philo”’s) brilliantly formulated
suggestions in the quotation from the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion which
began this essay—that ‘human’ notions of [design] might provide very dubious tem-
plates for theological extrapolation.
In Kant’s case, I have argued, there is also a sense in which he offered ‘cogito’-like
‘transcendental arguments’ as attempts
15 to furnish (or beg) a collective counterpart of Descartes’ individual (but allegedly
generic) ‘existence’-proof, and
16 derive the ‘existence of the external world’ (as well as a resolution of Descartes’
‘substantial-union’-problem) from the alleged exhaustiveness and universality of
such a ‘complete’ and ‘necessarily possible’ collective ‘intentionality’.
But if what is intentionally ‘possible’ is collapsed in such ways to what is experi-
entially ‘real’—a not entirely distortive thumbnail-sketch of Kant’s ‘critical’ rationale
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for Berkeleyan and Humean proposals—another variant of the recurrent dilemma I’ve
tried to canvass presents itself: either
17 one opens ‘experience’ to embrace indefinite hierarchies of provisional forms of
semantic paradox; or
18 one acknowledges that ‘experience’ is an inexpressible and almost neoplatonic
‘ideal’, and its alleged ‘closure’ a mystical as well as unintelligible ‘ultimate’
semantic paradox.
One might construe this dichotomy as a sort of conceptual ‘zero-one-law’, or coun-
terpart of Niels Bohr’s “komplementarität”: if it is not the case that ‘everything intel-
ligible’ is ‘problematic’, what ‘ensures’ us that ‘it’ is ‘unintelligible’?
Put in yet another form: we seem to want (or in our more judicious moods, ‘pos-
tulate’) ‘complete’ knowledge and ‘complete’ (unique) interpretation (cf. Pascal’s
acknowledgment that “le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie”).
But all we can ‘intelligibly’ (or ‘reasonably’) attain is incomplete ‘understanding’,
conjectural as well as plurally interpretable clarification, and fleeting forms of a-le¯theia
(‘non-ignorance’), rather than ‘ultimate’ ‘truth’.
Postulations of ‘complete’ knowledge, ‘objective’ truth and ‘unique’ interpretation,
like postulations of ‘ultimate’ subjective ‘enlightenment’, may be little more than
thinly veiled projections of intellectual vanity and vicarious aspirations to metaphysical
immortality.
So much for what might be called the via negativa of skeptical theoria
(“contemplation”), a dialectical interpellation which emerges—I have argued—from
fairly straightforward forms of metalogical analysis.
Its analogon—partially and tantalisingly reflected in the remarks of writers such
as Nicholas of Cusa—is the skeptical via contemplativa evoked in 1.9, at length in
Sect. 5, passim in Sect. 7 and more briefly in 8.1–8.3 above.
By way of transition to such a ‘way’ or ‘path’, consider first the following remarks
and conjectures about the differences between ‘skepticism’ and ‘mysticism’.
19 We tend to see more ‘simply’ ‘organised’ systems as ‘instruments’ for ‘us’ (or at
least for Kant’s “empirisches ich”).
20 We are more reluctant (quite understandably) to regard ‘ourselves’ as mere ‘means’
or ‘instruments’ for ‘others’, whether or not they are more ‘complex’ than ‘we’
are.
21 We tend finally to beg the ‘existence’ and ‘uniqueness’ of ‘gods’, ‘theodicies’
and ineffably complex secular ‘designs’ as Wunschvorstellungen of what might
‘confirm’ or at least ‘(over)see’ ‘us’.
“Intellectual vanity” aside, there seems to me a prima facie tension between
20 and 21, just above, thrown into sharper relief by Hume’s thumbnail critique of
anthropomorphic ‘idealism’ (“What particular privilege has this little Agitation of the
Brain….”) in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1976), cited earlier.
I have already argued, in effect, that such a tension defines that work’s principle
(and proto-‘critical’) disputatio—
22 whether the ‘deist’ “Cleanthes” can define a tenable ‘critical’ middle-ground
between the ‘skeptic’ “Philo”’s deconstructive counterexamples, and the quasi-
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‘mystical’ commonplaces of “Demea”, a Christian straw-man who stands in for
the much more searching ‘fideist’ musings of Blaise Pascal—
and tried to offer suggestive metalogical evidence that “he” (“Cleanthes”) cannot.
To see why I find this ‘evidence’ persuasive, consider first my suggestion that
23 “Demea”’s modest rhapsodies are indeed little more than faint echoes of much
more eloquent passages from the Pensées, one of which I have already quoted, but
24 Pascal’s evocations of our “disproportion” play a propaedeutic role in his larger
dogmatic argument, as (at least arguably) did comparable invocations of ineffable
infinities in the Enneads of Plotinus and Ethica of Spinoza.
In response to worthy defenders of these and other forms of ‘semantic monism”
(animated by a “monistic pathos”, in Lovejoy’s words, 1965), I have endeavored to
25 interpret skeptical “criterial problems” and “lapse[s] into infinit[ies]” as generative
structures worth further study;
26 argue that ‘ultimate’ metaphysical ‘unities’ ‘deduced’—by Spinoza, among
others—from begged dichotomic premises are metalogically ‘unintelligible”; and
27 offer ‘locally transcendental’interpretations of a “pluralistic pathos” in which ram-
ifying ‘intentional’ hierarchies reflect Kant’s “moral law within us”, and ramifying
‘intensional’ hierarchies reflect Kant’s ‘starred heaven(s) above us”.
This then is the skeptical counterpart of the dogmatic ‘via contemplativa’, men-
tioned earlier: a ‘reflective’ ‘pathos’ of limitless ‘critical’ hierarchies for
28 Demea’s (and Pascal’s) metalogically untenable fideism, and
Cleanthes’ (and Kant’s) metalogically untenable “middle way”.
One indication of the latter’s ‘untenability’ may be found in Kant’s ‘critically’
calibrated claims to have to ‘deduced’ the ‘necessary existence’ and unique inter-
pretability of ‘experience’ from its ‘possibility’.
For such formulations have appeared almost word for word in certain modal logi-
cians’ claims to ‘formalise’ Anselm’s ‘proof ’ of the ‘necessary existence’ and unique
interpretability of ‘god’ from its ‘conceivability’.
In §90 of the third Critique, moreover (which bears the interesting title “Von der
Art des Fürwahrhaltens in einem teleologischen Beweis des Dasein Gottes”; “On the
Manner of Holding-to-Be-True in a Teleological Proof of the Existence of God”),
Kant struggled in 1790 to formulate
29 “analogical” notions of “proof ” which might apply to ‘teleological’ insights,
desires for ‘higher’ forms of justice and other ‘merely regulative’ aspects of ‘rea-
son”s ‘fate’.
In this essay, I have tried to propose
30 ‘analogical’ notions of ‘proof ’ in limitless metatheoretic and hypotheoretic hier-
archies as ‘intelligible’ media for the expression of ‘reason”s ‘fate’, as well as
Kant’s ‘secular humanist’ ideals.
123
4306 Synthese (2014) 191:4253–4314
In accordance with the ‘via negativa’ sketched earlier, much may be processively
‘hidden’ and ‘uncovered’ in such ‘experiential’ hierarchies (contra Wittgenstein), in
the sense that
31 no ‘intelligible’ theoretical ‘horizon’ is or will ever be ‘comprehensive’, for exam-
ple (much less ‘define’ its own ‘azimuth’);
32 ‘merely regulative’ postulation of certain forms and probabilistic extensions of
metamathematical deduction are all the ‘inductive confirmation’ we should antic-
ipate;
and
33 Galileo’s mathematical “book” and its ‘intelligible’ metamathematical extensions
are ‘physically’ as well as ‘metaphysically’ ‘precise’ to the extent they are con-
ceptually (and generatively) ‘heuristic’ and ‘intelligible’.
In keeping with such Leitmotive, I have also argued that Kant’s ‘critical’ attempts
to discern ‘concepts’ from ‘ideas of reason’ led him to a valuable (and ‘heuristically’
generative) insight:
34 that such methodological clarifications and ‘synthetic’ realisations of otherwise
uninterpreted syntactical evidence are—‘locally’, but ‘inherently’—semantic and
metatheoretic rather than ‘immanent’; and
35 that his tacit acknowledgments in the Dialektic and third Critique that such
metatheoretical undertakings might be—‘locally’ but recurrently—‘transzendent’
suggest two more skeptical, ‘neo-Kantian’ conjectures: that
36 the very ‘intelligibility’ of (‘our’) ‘experience’ renders its ‘realisations’ (its “Ver-
wirklichungen” or “Vergegenständlichungen”) provisional, plurally interpretable
and inherently incomplete and ‘merely regulative’; and finally that
37 attempts to analyse and argue more precisely about such ‘realisations’ may lead us
into hierarchies—also ‘local’, but deeply heuristic as well as ‘merely’ regulative—
of ‘intended (re)interpretations’of ‘ourselves’ as well as our ‘experiences’.
‘Local’ and ‘heuristic’ notions of ‘truth’, ‘completeness’ and ‘(intended)
interpretation’, after all—like their ‘absolute’ dogmatic counterparts—are closely
interrelated with (equally ‘local’ and ‘heuristic’) notions of ‘design’.
And these, in turn, yield ‘critical’ rationales for ‘essentially incomplete’ notions of
‘knowledge’, ‘structure’ and ‘understanding’—‘inductive understanding’, for exam-
ple, that one ‘knows’ (provisionally, and in certain feasibly characterisable situations)
‘how to go on’.
Like ‘design’, ‘truth’ and the other epistemic and metaphysical ideals just cited
make sense for a given theory, in a particular metatheory. ‘Contemplatively’ invalu-
able, they become delusive—and ‘dogmatic’ as well as uninformative—only when
they too are raised to the level of their incompetence in vain efforts to ‘diagonalise’
them over ‘all’ theories in ‘all’ metatheories.
(We tend to lose sight, once again, of the facts that a ‘proof ’ was originally a ‘test’
(a ‘probatio’), and ‘truth’, in English, derived from a common germanic verb which
meant to ‘(en)trust’ or ‘believe’.)
I have also tried to argue at various points that
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38 iterated ‘zetetic’ recourse to metatheoretic clarification and refinement may be
heuristically ‘instrumental’, where
39 ‘instruments’ are (‘locally’) object-theoretic ‘means’ to more ‘systematic’ but
counterfactual as well as potentially heuristic (‘locally’) metatheoretic ‘ends’.
In particular, such ‘means’ or ‘instruments’ are object-theoretic with respect to
what (conceptually or metatheoretically) ‘instrumentalises’ them, and ‘experience’
‘organises’ ‘means’ and ‘ends’ in metalogical hierarchies of ‘object’- and ‘concept’-
formation which ramify without end.
(In this sense, what I wish to offer is a form of skeptical as well as ‘locally transcen-
dental idealism’, which hearkens back to Lucretius’ ‘alphabet’, as well as the ‘logica
magna’ Leibniz sought.)
In their efforts to explain ‘physical’ ‘experience’, for example, mathematicians and
mathematical-physicists—Galileo’s successors—resorted to more and more elabo-
rate metatheories to ‘define’ (or posit ‘existence’ of) object-theoretic ‘instruments’ as
‘means’ to more and more subtle (and conceptually ‘elegant’) ‘physical’ ends.
Mindful of this, I have tried to argue that mathematically literate metaphysicians
and epistemologists—Kant’s successors—should search (‘zetetically’) for more elab-
orate ‘intelligible’ metatheories to ‘define’ (or posit ‘existence’ of) object-theoretic
‘instruments’ as ‘means’ to subtler (and more conceptually ‘elegant’) ‘intended’ inter-
pretations of
40 ‘cognitive’ ends which clarify, at least provisionally, ‘liminal’ notions of ‘identity’,
‘awareness’ and ‘individual consciousness’, and
41 ‘ethical’ and ‘deontological’ ends which clarify, even more provisionally, collec-
tively ‘liminal’ notions of ‘equity’, ‘dignity’, ‘equanimity’ and ‘collective moral
sensibility’.
If these analogies are tenable, one might also characterise
42 Hume’s and Kant’s ‘idealist’ efforts to clarify ‘physical’ patterns in terms of ‘cog-
nitive’ counterparts as an attempt to clarify subtilia in subtiliora, and
43 Kant’s “Primat des Praktischen” as a conjecture that ‘ethical’ and ‘deontological’
ends or aims may be ‘deeper’ and more conceptually complex than their ‘physical’
and ‘cognitive’ counterparts.
Kant’s ‘counterfactual’ and ‘nonconstructive’ uses of “Regel” and “regulativ”, for
example, were as ambiguously suggestive as Hume’s ambiguous attempts to define
“Cause” in §60 of the first Enquiry. Perhaps it is ‘regulative’ of broader forms of
‘experience’ that we can ‘nonconstructively’ ‘anticipate’ schematic patterns we can-
not ‘determinately’ ‘understand’?
Graduated forms of ‘consciousness’, in particular, might be attributed to Sect. 6’s
‘systems’ (or more accurately to metastable patterns of such systems’ evolution in
appropriate Stone spaces), to the extent they
44 range ‘freely’ over ‘internal’ interpretations of [themselves], and ‘external’ inter-
pretations of [what might be beyond themselves]; where
45 ‘freedom’—like its ‘physical’counterparts—is an inherently contextual and rela-
tional as well as graduated notion:
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46 a system is ‘free’ to the extent the range and complexity of its responses exceed
that of any ‘internal’ or ‘external’ initial and boundary-conditions it may ‘take into
account’ in formulation of such responses.
Admittedly, all these conjectures and analogies are ‘impressionistic’, and concep-
tually (much) more inchoate and rudimentary than I would wish them to be.
But I believe they may be heuristically useful, and more particularly, that the
indefinite extendibility of metatheoretic ‘ascent’ and the non-‘well-foundedness’ of
hypotheoretic ‘descent’ are dual aspects of intelligibility which ‘mirror’ each other
in heuristically useful ways.
‘Hypotheoretic’ attributions of grades of ‘intention’, ‘cognition’ and ‘autonomy’,
for example, may ‘mirror’ ‘metatheoretic’ attributions of ‘interpretation’, ‘verifica-
tion’ and ‘experimental isolation’. (“The way up and the way down are one and the
same.”)
‘Reflective inquiry’, in this context, is inquiry in localisable stages of such hierar-
chies, and in their indefinitely iterable intentional ascents and intensional descents. As
‘we’ ‘see’ ‘simpler’ conative and cognitive structures, so may more ‘complex’ conative
and cognitive structures ‘see’ ‘us’. (“Whatever ye do to the least of these….”)
Consider, by way of partial summary, the following assertions and (rhetorical)
questions.
Kant’s ‘transzendentale Methode’ was arguably an attempt to make a certain sort
of ‘sufficient (‘synthetic a priori’) reason’ a fixed point for [itself ].
One might construe the arguments of this essay as an attempt to make metalogical
‘inquiry’ be an (endlessly transitional, but conceptually persistent) fixed point for
[itself ].
Contrary to Kant’s express views in the Analytic, the more “rein” and “a priori” a
theory (or “Erkenntnis”) is, the more (metalogically) incomplete it is, and (therefore)
the less “vollständig” it can be. Might this be a form of ‘practical’ as well conceptual
‘complementarity’?
The “Vollständigkeit” Kant attributed to “experience” was “constitutive”, but that of
ideas-of reason (‘merely’) “regulative”. Might recognition that both forms of inquiry
and concept-formation are ‘essentially’ incomplete, be a mark of John Keats’ ‘negative
capability’ (cited above), as well as the Würde (dignity) Kant attributed to ‘reasonable
beings’?
These questions are “rhetorical” in the sense that I find ‘good reasons’ to believe
(but cannot ‘prove’) that the ‘contemplative’ answer to each is “yes”.
For it seems a mark of stoic epistemic virtue and awareness of our boundless
limitations to continue to inquire and observe, knowing that ‘the’ path(s) branch in
liminally unobservable directions. It may even be a mark of some sort of epistemic
or conceptual ‘existentialism’ (in which the ‘essence’ of ‘essential incompleteness’
‘precedes’‘existence’).
Indeed, an awareness of ‘reason’s fate’ and its Sisyphean nature may be part of that
‘fate’, as well as a regulative ideal of Kant’s “reasonable beings”. But it might also
(as I suggested earlier) be one of their more ‘enlightened’ cradle-gifts. (To paraphrase
Beckett: “I ‘must’ go on. I can’t go on. I ‘will’ (to) go on….”)
123
Synthese (2014) 191:4253–4314 4309
Aristotle’s ‘desire to know’, for example, is not simply ‘sensory’. It is also the
desire to ‘value’ and to ‘cherish’ (This is a kind of ‘cognition’). And a broader and
more ‘reflective’ as well as ‘practical’ form of this is the desire to ‘value’ and ‘cherish’
what can ‘value’ and ‘cherish’.
To ‘know’ is to recognise what (apparently) ‘is’. To ‘value’ is to recognise (or
‘contemplate’) what may be, or might have been.
To form a ‘purpose’ and ‘evaluate’ alternative ‘means’ to attain it is to form a
(usually counterfactual, and in all cases metatheoretic) ‘plan’ in keeping with such
‘recognition’ or ‘contemplation’.
Such a plan, finally, is (practically) good to the extent it ‘values’ the (indeterminate)
plurality and range of other ‘reasonable beings” ‘plans’.
What is ‘just’ is what ‘reaches out’ (the original semantic sense of Aristotle’s
“desire”), by analogy with what is ‘felt within’ (the ‘golden rule’). This is ‘regulative’
of equity and other ‘practically’ significant forms of empathy and sympathy.
An absence of both in a ‘cognitive system’ is not ‘irrational’. But it is (metatheoret-
ically) ‘unreasonable’. It marks the absence or suppression of a form of higher-order
awareness.
The distinction between ‘irrational’ and ‘unreasonable’ is ‘practical’, metatheo-
retical, inherently ‘liminal’ and ‘merely regulative’ at every stage of ‘experience’.
Refusal or inability to make this distinction is a dogmatic ‘cognitive’ deficiency or
lack of ‘sensibility’ (or a deliberate attempt to dissemble, ‘blunt’ or ‘coarsen’ certain
‘natural’ forms of cognitive awareness).
There is also a fairly clear parallel between Hume’s de facto assimilation of “con-
ceivable” to “consistent”, Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ and Kant’s assimilation of
“gültig für uns” = allgemeingültig für jedermann” (“valid for us” = “universally valid
for everyone”; Pr, 1976, Sects. 18–19);
Both conflate “inconceivable to ‘us”’ with “inconceivable relative to a(n allegedly
normalised but subreptively begged) conception of ‘us’ (of what ‘we’ are). (For
comparison, cf. also Kant’s remarks about “nur komparative Allgemeingültigkeit”—
“merely comparative universal validity”, Sects. 18–19).
Such conflation may also be construed as a begged assertion that ‘the’ theory of
[‘the’ world] is a faithful or conservative extension of ‘our’ theory of [the world],
whatever Dinge an sich it may hypothetically adjoin.
If, moreover, ‘the world”s interpretation were faithful, as in the analysis of ‘cogito’-
like arguments sketched earlier, it would assure a not-so-desirable form of equicon-
sistency:
47 ‘the world’ would be consistent iff ‘I ’ am (or in Kant’s case, iff ‘we’ are).
A ‘solipsist’ metalogical consequence of this—that ‘the world’ would cease to
‘exist’ iff ‘I ’ cease to ‘exist’—would effectively nullify Kant’s categorical imperative,
as well as the ‘skeptical’ variant I proposed above:
48 to treat others not as (mere) means, but as (vulnerable as well as ‘reasonable’
beings in search of ‘higher’) ends in (and beyond) themselves.
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Given also that ‘strong’ interpretations of ‘us’ and ‘our’ world-views are not ‘faith-
ful’ in the metalogical sense outlined earlier, the more relevant epistemic as well as
‘practical’ question would not seem to me
49 whether ‘absolute’ (ethical or epistemic) norms, standards or criteria ‘exist’;
but rather—given the metalogical ‘unintelligibility’ of ‘absolute’ norms, standards and
criteria in the senses outlined above—
50 whether (and when) it is reasonable for sentient beings to impose their norms,
standards or criteria as such.
Along similar lines, it also seems to me that dicta that “everything is determined”
would not imply that ‘everything is forgivable’ (on the model of “tout comprendre,
c’est tout pardonner”), but rather that
51 ‘practical’ notions of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘sympathy’ as well as ‘responsibility’
would have no meaning…; for
52 a ‘free’ being which refused to admit its actions might be wrong would be an
inconsistent cognitive as well as ethical agent, in the sense that
53 nothing could be ‘right’—‘practically’ or ethically ‘right’—to a being which could
not admit—‘wholeheartedly’ admit—that it might be wrong.
A ‘rational’ being is also ‘practical’ as well as ‘reasonable’ to the extent it acknowl-
edges that it is neither unique nor self-sufficient, and undertakes to seek to ‘respect’
cognate desires and forms of awareness in its (apparent) ‘semblables’.
At every stage of ‘reflective inquiry’, this awareness is graduated, underdetermined
and physically vulnerable. But its absence is a ‘cognitive’ deficiency all the same, in
the sense that it closes itself to broader forms of semantic ‘awareness’.
For zetetic inquiry is not only regulative of ‘experience’. It is also, it seems to me,
a ‘liminal’ form—and perhaps prototype—of Kant’s “Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck”
and other ‘nonconstructive’ notions one might devise, such as
54 “Gefühlsmäßigkeit ohne (eindeutig determinierte) Gefühl(e)”;
“Regelmäßigkeit ohne (eindeutig determinierte) Regel(n);
“Rechtmäßigkeit ohne (eindeutig determiniertes) Recht”;
“Gesetzmäßigkeit ohne (eindeutig determiniertes) Gesetz”; ….
To the extent such “-mäßigkeiten” urge respect for honest inquiry, they may express
something like Kant’s “purely good will” as well as Aristotle’s ‘desire to ‘know”. And
respect for them enjoins us to value two forces which through the green fuse drive
the flower: ‘desire’ for ‘understanding’ and ‘sympathy’ ‘within’ us’, and ‘awe’ for the
‘starred firmament’ ‘above’ us.
The ‘desire’ in particular, takes many forms: a desire to (continue to be part of)
(conscious) ‘experience’; a desire to ‘understand’ the diapason of ‘experience’ in
ways which cannot be fulfilled; and a desire to seek, value and protect that fragile
‘understanding’ as the ‘reason’ of ‘reasonable beings’.
Kant had a point, therefore, about the ‘intentional’ and ‘self-referential’ aspects
of epistemic, ‘practical’, aesthetic, and ‘reflective’ ‘autonomy’. But autonomous
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‘selves’—essentially by definition—have no ‘ultimate’ clarification of what it ‘is’
they are supposed to ‘legislate’, or ‘ultimate’ intelligible ‘aim’ to which everything
else is ‘reduced’ or ‘interpreted’.
For the self-referentiality of ‘intelligible’ ‘Selbstgesetzgebung’ and ‘Selbstzwecke’
must be incomplete and ‘problematic’, in the sense that they are assertible only
in processively metatheoretic contexts which must provisionally be resolved in yet
‘higher’ ‘coded’ counterparts.
Any conceptual act which claimed to ‘verify [its own] ‘existence’ (or “Reinheit”,
or ‘experimental isolation’, or ….)’ would therefore undo the ‘verification’, by rela-
tivising the ‘existence’ (or “Reinheit”, or ‘experimental isolation’, or ….).
‘The’ boundary line between Kantian ‘reason’ and ‘experience’ is also
(in)determinate iff ‘the’ boundary between Kantian ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ is
(in)determinate iff ‘the’ boundaries between Kantian ‘Spekulation’ and ‘Praxis’ and
‘Spekulation’ and ‘Reflexion’ are (in)determinate.
The more ‘global’ one’s theoretical aspirations, therefore—and the more ‘holist’
one’s theory or theoria—the more open to metatheoretic ascent and emergent reinter-
pretation(s) such aspirations and theoria will have to be.
The broader the Rechtmäßigkeit of Deduktion becomes, the less clear it is why it is
not simply ‘reflective’, ‘regulative’ and ‘problematisch’, and the more suggestive the
thought that such breadth is a ‘good” thing.
Skeptical ‘theoria’ (‘contemplation’) and the forms of ataraxia (‘peace of mind)
also have their own ‘light’-images—skepsis itself, for example, and Horizonte among
them—which reflect (and reflect on) their more ‘dogmatic’ and ‘hieratic’ counterparts
(Plato’s eide¯, Descartes’ intuitio, neo-Platonic ‘emanations’, ….).
Incomplete and inadequate as the skeptical images are, they are at least more ‘open’
to further ‘clarification’, for they are exquisitely ‘relational’, by definition as well as
programmatic intent (‘insight’ against what ‘backlight’? ‘scrutiny’ and ‘enlighten-
ment’ ‘relative’ to what source? ‘escape’ in which ‘direction’, and toward which
form(s) of greater ‘illumination’?)
Unlike Plato’s (literally ‘linear’) ‘line’ and Kant’s ‘two truths’, such images also
evoke a distributive and ‘graduated’ skeptical counterpart of Aristotle’s ‘theoretical’
noesis noe¯seos (thought about thought), whose ramifications suggest to me a great
tree of conceptual life.
The ‘abstraction’ characteristic of metalogical analysis is a counterpart of ‘egal-
itarianism’ in ethics, and ‘experimental isolation’ in ‘natural philosophy’. (Cf. also
Kant’s “rein” and “a priori”)
These views seem to me to reflect elusive egalitarian ideals of Kantian ethics which
transcend his secular-pietist preoccupation with ‘absolute’ forms of ‘duty’, and enjoin
us to ‘respect’ fleeting nuances of ‘consciousness’ which ‘reasonable beings’ inter-
mittently enjoy, and may (or may not) endeavor to ‘respect’ in their fellows.
Such genuine egalitarianism is a ‘merely regulative’ ideal. And intelligible
“Zwecke” ‘exist’ only in provisional stages or levels of Zweckmäßigkeit. But the very
openness and incompleteness of such ideals may offer a glimpse into comparably
‘open’ aspects of moral eternity.
123
4312 Synthese (2014) 191:4253–4314
For whatever “particular privilege …. this little Agitation of the Brain” may have (in
response to the opening remark from Hume’s Dialogues), it is probably not particular
to ‘us’.
And complex ‘intentional’ “systems” of “inquiry” which “ramify” with what they
“discover” may be ‘regulative’ of other (would-be) ‘reasonable beings’, which may
pose or have posed similar questions, in the past, in the future, or “in another galaxy,
long ago and far away”.
What rides the wavefronts of ‘for the sake of which’ (so to speak) is (‘reflective’)
‘consciousness’, which flourishes as it inquires, in unfinished forms of ‘eudaimonia’
as well as ‘theoria’. And it is about this we should be generous and egalitarian (the
‘categorical imperative’, like the ‘golden rule’, is a moral ‘identity of indiscernibles’
principle.)
Aspirations to understand deeper aspects of this ideal are ‘desirable in themselves’,
and collectively, they afford a kind of scheme of provisional fixed-points for what I
have called ‘reflective inquiry’.
The conviction that we can make ‘reflective’ appeals to ‘merely’ regulative ideals
of such ‘schematic fixed points’ is a regulative ideal ‘in itself’. But it requires (as a
‘precondition’, so to speak) that we accept (in simple terms) that
55 it’s all ‘problematic’, for expressible (‘intelligible’)‘contemplation’ must be
incomplete.
(Compare James’ first ‘free’ intentional ‘act’, to ‘believe’ in his ‘freedom’ to
act.) The skeptic’s first ‘un(der)determined’ intentional act is to ‘believe’ in skepti-
cal ‘un(der)determination’—as something ‘known to reason alone’ and ‘known from
(within) ‘experience”.
None of this provides any ‘final’ resolution for the questions which eternally recur.
Which “systems”, for example? ‘Consciousness of ‘what’? Where will it ‘end’?
To interrogate ourselves in this way is to pose questions, once again (such as Kant’s
drei Fragen in KdrV, B 832–833 and Logik, IX, A 25),
“die sie …nicht beantworten kann, denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der men-
schlichen Vernunft” (KdrV, A VII, cited earlier) (“which one…cannot answer, for they
exceed every capacity of human reason”)….
The same recurrent tensions also evoked one of Pascal’s deepest and most ‘existen-
tial’ (as well as ‘secular’) insights in the following well-known passage, elliptically
quoted earlier, and perhaps the most eloquent evocation ever written of the sort of
courage Kierkegaard later attributed (dismissively) to his ‘knight of infinite resigna-
tion’ (in the original Danish simply ‘knight of infinity’—‘Uendelighedens Ridder’):
La dernière démarche de la raison est de reconnaitre qu’il y a une infinité des
choses qui la surpassent.…
L’homme n’est qu’un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c’est un roseau
pensant.
Il ne faut pas que l’univers entier s’arme pour l’écraser; une vapeur, une goutte
d’eau suffit pur le tuer. Mais quand l’univers l’écraserait, l’homme serait encore
plus noble que ce qui le tue, puisqu’il sait qu’il meurt et l’avantage que l’univers
a sur lui. L’univers n’en sait rien.
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Toute notre dignité consiste donc en la pensée. C’est de là qu’il faut nous relever
et non de l’espace et de la durée, que nous ne saurions remplir. Travaillons donc
à bien penser: voilà le principe de la morale. (Pensées, 188 and 200)
The last step of reason is to recognise that there are an infinity of things that
surpass it.…
A human being is a reed, the weakest of nature, but it is a thinking reed. It isn’t
necessary for the whole universe to take arms to crush it; a vapor, a waterdrop is
enough to kill it. But when the universe crushes it, the human being is still nobler
than what kills it, for it knows that it is dying and the advantage the universe has
over it.
The universe knows nothing.
All our dignity consists therefore in thought. It’s from there we should take our
orientation, and not from space and time, which we cannot fill. So let us work
to think well: this is the principle of morals.
In the limitless contexts of reflective inquiry and skeptical ‘experience’ (with apolo-
gies to Leonard Woolf), the journey not the arrival matters.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Anselm of Canterbury. (1978). Fides Quaerens Intellectum, ed. with a French translation by Alexandre
Koyré. Paris: Vrin.
Anselm of Canterbury. (1986). Monologion and Proslogion. In A new interpretive translation of St. Anselm’s
Monologion and Proslogion, ed. with an English translation by Jasper Hopkins. Minneapolis: Banning.
Aristotle. (1975). Nicomachean Ethics, ed. with an English translation by H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Aristotle. (1975/1977). Metaphysics, ed. with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Bell, J., & Machover, M. (1977). Mathematical logic. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Berkeley, G. (1979). In A. A. Luce, & T. E. Jessop (Eds.), Works. Nendeln: Kraus Reprint.
Boos, W. (1983). A self-referential ‘Cogito’. Philosophical Studies, 44, 269–290.
Boos, W. (1987). Theory-relative skepticism. Dialectica, 41(3), 175–207.
Boos, W. (1997). Skeptical theoria as a regulative ideal. Typescript.
Boos, W. (1998). The Transzendenz of metamathematical ‘experience’. Synthese, 114, 49–99.
Cantor, G. (1933). Gesammelte Abhandlungen. Berlin: Springer. (Reprinted by Hildesheim: Olms Verlag,
1966.)
Chang, C. C., & Keisler, H. J. (1973/1972). Model theory. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Descartes, R. (1973–1978). Oeuvres de Descartes. In C. Adam et P. Tannery (Eds.), Nouvelle Présentation.
Paris: Vrin (AT).
Enderton, H. (1972). A mathematical introduction to logic. New York: Academic.
Galileo, G. (1970). The Assayer, Opere, Vol. 6. Napoli: F. Rossi.
Hume, D. (1975). In P. Nidditch (Ed.), Enquiries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, D. (1976). In J. Price (Ed.), Dialogues concerning natural religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kant, I. (1956). In R. Schmidt (Ed.), Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Meiner (KdrV).
Kant, I. (1965). In K. Vorländer (Ed.), Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten. Hamburg: Meiner (Gr).
Kant, I. (1974a). In K. Vorländer (Ed.) Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Hamburg: Meiner (KdpV).
Kant, I. (1974b). In K. Vorländer (Ed.), Kritik der Urteilskraft. Hamburg: Meiner (KdU).
123
4314 Synthese (2014) 191:4253–4314
Kant, I. (1976). In K. Vorländer (Ed.), Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik. Hamburg: Meiner
(Pr).
Kant, I. (2003). Werke, Briefwechsel und Nachlaß auf CD Rom. Berlin: Karsten Worm. (KW ; cited roman
numerals refer to the 1905 Akademie-Ausgabe).
Keats, J. (1959). In D. Bush (Ed.), Selected poems and letters. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Leibniz, G. (1978). In C. Gerhardt (Ed.), Die philosophische Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz.
Hildesheim: Olms.
Lovejoy, A. (1965). The great chain of being. New York: Harper.
Pascal, B. (1963). Pensées. In L. Lafuma (Ed.), Oeuvres Complètes. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Plato. (1969). Republic, ed. with a translation by Paul Shorey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sextus Empiricus. (1976). Vols. I–IV, ed. with an English translation by R. G. Bury. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. Vol. I, Pyrroneion Hypotyposeon (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) (PH I, PH II), Vol. II,
Adversus Mathematicos (Against the Teachers) (M VII, M VIII).
Smorynski, C. (1977). The incompleteness theorems. In J. Barwise (Ed.), Handbook of mathematical logic
(pp. 821–865). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Spinoza, B. (1967). Werke II (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and Ethica). Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Van Heijenoort, J. (Ed.). (1967). From Frege to Gödel, A source book in mathematical logic, 1879–1931.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1972). Über Gewißheit. New York: Harper and Collins (ÜG).
123
